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Most legal terms mean little to laypeople. Ask an average 
person about an adhesory contract, the doctrine of equivalents, 
or even a plain old tort, and you’re nearly certain to get no 
more than a blank stare. But property is different. People care 
about property—a lot. Consider, for example, how the Supreme 
Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London1 moved an 
often apathetic public into apoplexy. The outrage generated by 
Kelo spanned the political spectrum from Limbaugh on the 
right2 to Nader on the left.3 It also spawned a ferocious legisla-
tive reaction as states hastily sought to overturn the decision’s 
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 1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 2. Rush Limbaugh: Liberals Like Stephen Breyer Have Bastardized the 
Constitution (Free Republic radio transcript Oct. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Lim-
baugh], available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1501453/posts 
(claiming that because of Kelo, “[g]overnment can kick the little guy out of his 
and her homes and sell those home [sic] to a big developer who’s going to pay a 
higher tax base to the government. Well, that’s not what the takings clause 
was about. It’s not what it is about. It’s just been bastardized, and it gets bas-
tardized because you have justices on the court who will sit there and impose 
their personal policy preferences rather than try to get the original intent of 
the Constitution.”). 
 3. Ralph Nader, Statement, June 23, 2005, http://ml.greens.org/piper 
mail/ctgp-news/2005-June/000507.html (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Kelo v. City of New London mocks common sense, tarnishes constitutional 
law and is an affront to fundamental fairness.”). 
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force via statute.4 At the high-water mark of the backlash, a 
movement even arose to have Justice Souter’s house in New 
Hampshire condemned pursuant to the state’s eminent domain 
power.5  
At first blush, the impassioned negative reaction to Kelo is 
unsurprising. The public recoiled at the Court’s ratification of 
government’s power to force homeowners to involuntarily ex-
change their property for cash.6 Yet not all government attenu-
ations of property interests have generated the same kind of 
reaction. Consider, for example, Eldred v. Ashcroft.7 In Eldred, 
the Court upheld the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA),8 
which added twenty years to all extant copyright terms.9 El-
dred, like Kelo, can be understood as approving government 
confiscation of an ownership right, albeit a confiscation of a 
public rather than a private entitlement.10 CTEA’s passage 
meant that the public would have to wait another two decades 
before its use rights in copyrighted works of authorship would 
vest. This had implications writ small (preventing Eric Eldred 
from posting a Robert Frost poem on his public web page) and 
large (preventing general public use of early Disney creations, 
including Mickey Mouse). But while CTEA and its judicial ap-
proval drew criticism in academic circles, public response was 
muted—especially compared to the reaction to Kelo. 
 
 4. For a complete list of such state initiatives, see Castle Coalition, 
Enacted Legislation Since Kelo, http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php? 
option=com_content&task=view&id=510 (last visited Dec. 7, 2009). However 
politically popular they may be, the efficacy of these statutes is questionable. 
See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Response to Kelo, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2103–04 (2009) (finding the majority of reform laws “like-
ly to be ineffective”). 
 5. The idea was to have the local council of Weare, New Hampshire con-
demn the Justice’s property in order to create a development that would fea-
ture the “Lost Liberty Hotel,” a site that would be devoted to libertarian ga-
therings. The movement failed. See Jeannie Suk, Taking the Home, 20 LAW & 
LITERATURE 291, 293–94 (2008).  
 6. See id. at 295–98 (describing the potential loss of home ownership to 
eminent domain or to foreclosure as distinctly generative of anxiety). 
 7. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 8. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (also known as the “Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act”). 
 9. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193–94. 
 10. See Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copy-
right Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 128 (2002) (calling CTEA 
“a massive giveaway of public domain resources for private use”). 
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The disparity between the reactions to these two decisions 
becomes even more puzzling on closer examination. Despite un-
informed media commentators’ characterizations of Kelo as an 
instance of judicial activism,11 the Court’s opinion was rather 
mundane jurisprudentially.12 The decision broke little new le-
gal ground, largely following precedent originally established in 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.13 Nor did the Court exer-
cise its authority expansively; on the contrary, the majority 
couched its opinion primarily in terms of its obligation to defer 
to the Connecticut state legislature’s discretionary decision to 
exercise its eminent domain power.14 Nor did the decision (as 
many members of the public misunderstood) rob anyone of 
their property without recompense. Although Suzette Kelo’s 
property was taken, she was, as the Constitution requires, paid 
a compensatory amount in exchange by the government.15 Al-
though one may well believe Kelo was wrongly decided, this 
does not mean that the decision represented an institutionally 
aggressive move or that it was at all surprising in light of long-
settled precedent. 
On the other hand, the government conduct approved in 
Eldred in many ways worked a much more dramatic taking 
than the City of New London did when it confiscated Suzette 
Kelo’s property.16 Like the state action in Kelo, CTEA trans-
 
 11. See Limbaugh, supra note 2. 
 12. See Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v. City of 
New London, Babbit v. Sweet Home, and Other Tales from the Supreme Court, 
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 683 (2006) (“Perhaps the only surprising part of the 
[Kelo] decision was Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s scathing dissent . . . .”). 
 13. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 14. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (emphasizing 
the Court’s “longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this 
field”). 
 15. It is a familiar point that the “just compensation” required by the 
Constitution undercompensates condemned homeowners because the fair 
market value standard fails to reflect owners’ subjective valuations of their 
homes. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 183 (1985). Recent scholarship has, however, 
questioned this assumption, showing that homeowners may in fact be over-
compensated by the government in eminent domain proceedings because they 
receive relocation expenses on top of the value of their home, and because 
homeowners may be able to receive a premium on top of fair market value 
through precondemnation negotiations with the government. Nicole Stelle 
Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 101, 121–31 (2006). 
 16. I am not arguing that CTEA really did work a taking actionable under 
the Just Compensation Clause. Textually, this is not possible because the 
Clause governs only takings of “private” property, U.S. CONST. amend. V, and 
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ferred an entitlement from one group (the public) to another 
(copyright owners) without the former’s consent. But unlike the 
plaintiffs in Kelo, the dispossessed public received no compen-
sation in exchange for its loss. CTEA also swept much more 
broadly than the government action approved in Kelo. The tak-
ing at issue in Kelo directly affected only the plaintiff and a few 
similarly situated actors. By contrast, CTEA took not just from 
the original plaintiff Eric Eldred, but from every member of the 
public the entitlement to use expired copyrighted materials for 
another twenty years.17  
The disparity in the reactions to these two opinions—which 
I call the Kelo-Eldred puzzle—is instructive for a pair of rea-
sons. First, it illustrates the powerful hold that the idea of 
property has on the public consciousness. Underneath the poli-
ticized invective that characterized much of Kelo’s aftermath, 
one can identify in the public reaction a very real sense of in-
dignation at the dignitary harm worked on Suzette Kelo by the 
City of New London’s forcible taking of her home. Popular writ-
ing on the subject typically invoked the notion of “property” 
without considering the meaning of the term or the institution 
in any real depth.18 This highlights the instinctive sense of 
connection between “property” as it is popularly understood 
and instinctive notions of both personal identity and the invi-
 
as I discuss below in more detail, the public domain is plainly a form of public 
property. That does not change the fact that Eldred can still be cast as an un-
compensated taking of public entitlements, even though it does not give rise to 
a cause of action under the Fifth Amendment. 
 17. One could argue that CTEA thus merely delayed, and did not take, 
the public’s acquisition-of-use rights in copyrighted materials. While this de-
scriptive claim is right, it does not mean the government’s action is not tak-
ings-esque. A law that stated “the acquisition of all future interests in real 
property will be deferred for twenty years” would undoubtedly be regarded as 
taking a valuable property right from the owners of those future interests. Cf. 
Hemphill v. Miss. State Highway Comm’n, 145 So. 2d 455, 463 (Miss. 1962) 
(holding that state takings of future interests require a just compensation re-
medy). It is also by no means clear that the public actually will acquire these 
rights in protected materials upon expiration of the CTEA term extensions. 
Numerous critics of Eldred pointed out that nothing would stop the content 
industries from again lobbying successfully for additional term extensions 
once CTEA’s twenty-year add-on terms begin to expire. See, e.g., Eldred v. Re-
no, 239 F.3d 372, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no 
apparent substantive distinction between permanent protection and perma-
nently available authority to extend originally limited protection.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Conservative Union, Judicial Activism 
Strikes Again: Supreme Court Rules Government Can Seize Your Home (June 
23, 2005), http://www.conservative.org/pressroom/06232005_un.asp (“Today’s 
Supreme Court ruling is a slap in the face to property owners everywhere.”).  
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olability of ownership. That property can generate such emo-
tional power also shows how much mileage a social movement 
can gain by couching its aims in terms of protecting possession 
and ownership. 
The Kelo-Eldred puzzle also indicates, by negative implica-
tion, the curious absence of property rhetoric when public, ra-
ther than private, entitlements are depleted.19 The outrage 
over Kelo was outrage about property taken without the own-
er’s consent: Suzette Kelo and her co-plaintiffs had their homes 
confiscated by the government, and this inflamed the public 
consciousness. Eldred might well have been seen in this light 
too: the public enjoys entitlements to copyrighted works of au-
thorship after their terms of protection expire (an ownership 
entitlement), and CTEA diminished these rights (confiscated 
their entitlement) by delaying their vesting date. One can 
search in vain for the kind of popular outrage against involun-
tary government confiscations of property in reaction to Eldred 
that was commonplace in the wake of Kelo.20 Eldred evoked 
nothing like the angry reaction that accompanied Kelo in large 
part because the public did not evaluate the decision within the 
moral or rhetorical framework of property rights.  
The Kelo-Eldred puzzle provides a jumping-off point for an 
exploration of the role of property rhetoric in judicial, policy-
making, and popular cultural debates about the ideal scope of 
intellectual property protection. Why is it that Eldred was as 
notable for its silence as Kelo was for the angry reaction it gen-
erated? As I detail in Part I of this Article, the answer lies in 
the impoverished way we talk about property, especially with 
respect to dialogue about the ideal scope of copyright and pa-
tent. Those who prefer broader intellectual property (IP) rights 
 
 19. One might also point out that the most salient difference between 
these two cases is the nature of the entitlement at issue: Kelo involved tangi-
ble property, while Eldred involved intangible resources. This may be a partial 
explanation for the reaction, but cannot be a complete one. As I discuss at 
more length below, the intangible character of an entitlement has not pre-
vented owners from effectively leveraging property rhetoric in their favor, so 
the fact that information rather than land is at issue cannot fully explain why 
the public failed to react to Eldred as an unjustified deprivation of property. 
See infra Part I.B. 
 20. There was ample academic outrage, of course. See generally, e.g., 
Symposium, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, 
and the Constitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2003) (collecting articles critical 
of Eldred from academics of all political stripes). There was also some popular 
reaction to the decision, such as Bill Amend’s sarcastic jab at the Court’s deci-
sion in the cartoon FoxTrot. BILL AMEND, FOXTROTIUS MAXIMUS 144 (2004). 
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and those who resist them both assume that speaking about IP 
in the idiom of property will inevitably lead to an expansion of 
private rights in information. 
In Part II, I show that this shared assumption is flawed 
because it depends on an incomplete view of what ownership 
means. One strain of property discourse invokes a libertarian 
vision of ownership as bulwark of individual liberty against 
state oppression and an efficient means of maximizing private 
wealth. But focusing exclusively on this ownership discourse of 
property ignores an alternative, social discourse that sees pos-
session in a broader social context. From Roman roads to the 
English village green to the contemporary national park, the 
property relation has long taken the public writ large, and not 
just private individuals, as its subject. Ownership doesn’t only 
recognize that greed is good, but also attends to the common 
good. A descriptively accurate and balanced use of property 
rhetoric—including intellectual property rhetoric—must take 
into account each of these traditions and their concomitant val-
ues.  
Finally, in Part III, I argue that it is not only possible but 
particularly appropriate to talk about IP in the language of a 
socially focused property discourse. Property rhetoric that si-
tuates public resources at its center aligns particularly well 
with intellectual property, which, after all, is grounded in a 
constitutional clause that emphasizes the public domain and 
the common good.21 Seen from this perspective, property rhe-
toric is not necessarily the enemy of the public domain, as most 
scholars seem to assume. Rather, it is possible to explicitly 
present public entitlements in information as a subject of own-
ership, albeit a mutually owned possession that we are all en-
titled to access and use.  
Using property rhetoric this way in legal and popular de-
bates about the scope of IP protection should prove an effective 
means for preserving an optimal public/private balance in in-
formation entitlements. First, emphasizing that property in-
cludes public entitlements as well as private ones provides 
needed pushback against the powerful but overly broad claims 
of rights in information that are commonly made by content in-
dustry players such as movie studios and music lobbyists. Em-
phasizing the public character of many information entitle-
ments helps to cabin owners’ claims of property rights within 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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their appropriate bounds. Second, talking about shared IP en-
titlements using the language of ownership promises not only 
to access the deeply instinctive attachment to property we all 
share, but to redirect the emotional force of that attachment in 
the direction of public as well as private resources. This use of 
property rhetoric in talking about the elements of copyright 
and patent law that explicitly cordon off entitlements for the 
public promises to encourage respect for, and stewardship of, 
shared cultural resources. 
I.  PROPERTY ROMANCE AND PROPERTY ANXIETY   
A. LAW AND/AS RHETORIC 
Law’s language is so crowded with graceless terminology 
(“fee simple subject to condition subsequent”) and obscure Latin 
(ignorantia legis neminem excusat) that “intellectual property,” 
at least by contrast, possesses something like elegance.22 This 
is not only because the phrase itself is kind of mellifluous,23 but 
also because it contains an internal contradiction. Intellectual 
property at once expresses something ephemeral and abstract 
(the process of intellection) as well as something hard and con-
crete (the bordered, fixed, and certain notion of possession). So 
it should come as no surprise that much ink has been spilled 
about IP’s peculiar status as a form of property.24 Writers have 
 
 22. “Patent law” and “copyright law” were, until only a few decades ago, 
largely thought of as formalist fields of practice that were mainly about fuss-
ing with registration applications. After the term “intellectual property law-
yer” was coined, however, the profession gained both esteem and adherents. 
See Mark Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031, 1034 & n.5 (2005).  
 23. Say it a few times. It’s just short of being a three-foot anapest. Cf. id. 
at 1034 (“‘Intellectual property’ is an appealing term for a variety of reasons. 
It is sexy: practitioners in the field will tell you that their stock at cocktail par-
ties went up immeasurably when they began to tell people they ‘did intellec-
tual property’ rather than that they were ‘patent lawyers.’”). 
 24. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating En-
titlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1744 (2007) (“At the core of con-
troversies over the correct scope of intellectual property lie grave doubts about 
whether intellectual property is property.”). Not all writers are convinced that 
this is a question worth engaging. See Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter 
Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715, 715 
(1993) (“Every now and then, the rather discrete and insular world of scholars 
who care about intellectual property rules turns its collective attention to 
whether intellectual property is really property at all—or, to put the matter 
consistently with the vagaries of the field, whether intellectual property 
(whatever that is) is property (whatever that is) in the same sense that other 
things are property (whatever that is).”); The Patry Copyright Blog, Does It 
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considered whether property or liability rules should govern 
copyright and patent,25 asked whether the differences between 
physical and intellectual property can be explained in terms of 
information costs,26 and defended the view that the law govern-
ing tangible and intangible things should be essentially conti-
nuous.27 In this Article, I seek to investigate this question from 
a different perspective. Rather than looking at this issue from 
the perspective of law as regulation, I examine the social mean-
ing of invoking property as a rhetorical trope in debates over 
the scope of patent and copyright protection. This investigation 
begins with a descriptive account of how commentators, jurists, 
and policymakers embrace or resist the language of property in 
the IP setting, and then explores how enthusiasm for (or resis-
tance to) this use of property rhetoric correlates with prefe-
rences for broad or narrow IP rights.  
Rhetoric has a bad rap in contemporary public discourse. 
We often dismiss arguments as “mere rhetoric,” suggesting that 
they are flawed by sloppy inexactitude, or even characterized 
by disingenuous manipulation. Notwithstanding a number of 
masterful studies in a rhetorical vein,28 legal scholarship often 
shies from openly treating law as rhetoric. As a result, writers 
in the field most often regard law exclusively as an external 
system of rules that can be manipulated to reach particular 
substantive ends by means of coercing and enticing action.29 
The relative absence of rhetorical study in legal scholarship is 
particularly puzzling. The ancients regarded rhetoric as inex-
tricably intertwined with dialogue about the good life, which 
had its ultimate manifestation in law. Aristotle idealized rheto-
ricians as gifted communicators who convinced the public about 
important normative questions using a balance of compelling 
 
Matter if Copyright Is Property?, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2006/06/does 
-it-matter-if-copyright-is.html (June 20, 2006, 09:57 EST). 
 25. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Lia-
bility Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 783–84 & 784 n.4 
(2007). 
 26. See Smith, supra note 24, at 1799–1819. 
 27. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 113–14 (1990). 
 28. Examples abound. My favorite is Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos 
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
 29. See James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of 
Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 685 (1985) (contrasting 
rhetorical analysis of law with ancient Judeo-Christian notion of law as au-
thority and with contemporary social scientific view of law as an external sys-
tem of rules to be manipulated to reach particular substantive ends). 
  
660 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:652 
 
logic (logos) and appealing character (ethos).30 If this sounds 
like what lawyers and legal academics do on a daily basis, 
that’s probably because it is. As Dave McGowan conjectured, 
the reason that law and its practitioners often express disdain 
for rhetoric may be because it so closely approximates what it is 
they do.31  
In this Article, I seek to embrace rather than resist the 
centrality of rhetoric in law. In Plato’s eponymous dialogue, 
Gorgias defined rhetoric as “the art of persuading people about 
justice and injustice in the public places of the state.”32 Rhetor-
ic thus refers not to merely talking about talking, but to some-
thing with meaningful practical implications. It is no less than 
“the central art by which community and culture are estab-
lished, maintained, and transformed.”33 This persuasion is 
achieved primarily by appealing to a set of common under-
standings.34 In legal discourse, this appeal has two valences. 
First, rhetoric frames legal arguments, and those frames de-
termine what substantive legal analysis applies to the issue at 
hand.35 Second, the choice to use particular terms can per-
suade—or dissuade—by calling up particular associations that 
generate visceral reactions in listeners.36 
Rhetoric not only frames public discourse, but also has the 
capacity to change how we think about the subjects of that dis-
 
 30. See David McGowan, (So) What if It’s All Just Rhetoric?, 21 CONST. 
COMMENT. 861, 861 (2004) (reviewing EUGENE GARBER, FOR THE SAKE OF AR-
GUMENT: PRACTICAL REASONING, CHARACTER, AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF 
(2004)). 
 31. Id. at 886 (“Maybe we condemn the word ‘rhetoric’ to divert attention 
from how well it applies to what we do.”). 
 32. White, supra note 29, at 684 (citing PLATO, GORGIAS 452e, 454b). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 688–89. 
 35. See David McGowan, Information-Forcing Liability Rules in Copyright 
Law (Nov. 10, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 36. See DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS 3–4 (2d 
ed. 1998) (discussing how Judge Posner uses phrases like “allocate,” “maxim-
ize,” “value” and “scarcity” in both a technical sense and “to evoke Scientific 
power, to claim precision without necessarily using it” to describe the efficien-
cy of the common law in RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98–99 
(1st ed. 1972)). 
Contemporary behavioral psychology has introduced a variation on the 
idea of rhetorical framing, showing that how issues are framed affects the 
heuristics people use to decide on the morality of particular conduct. See Cass 
R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531, 535 (2005). For 
example, framing a decision as a choice between actively aiding someone’s 
death versus failing to save someone in mortal peril will trigger very different 
moral instincts, even though they lead to the same result. Id. at 540–41. 
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course. Recasting same-sex marriage as a civil rights issue, for 
example, exemplifies this sort of “constitutive” rhetorical 
move.37 It is not only an attempt to use language to persuade 
us to adopt a particular position, but seeks also to convince us 
about what the world actually is like (or at least, what it should 
be like). If same-sex marriage advocates can occupy the rhetori-
cal high ground, they not only score a legal and political victo-
ry, but also convince the public that access to marriage really is 
a part of America’s ongoing struggle to provide justice for all its 
citizens. So rhetoric represents not only a way of understanding 
the world; it is a form of reasoning with constitutive force be-
cause it has the potential to construct the way we think about 
the world.38 With these general ideas in mind, I now turn to an 
exploration of how property is used as a rhetorical trope in de-
bates over the ideal scope of patent and copyright protection. 
B. PROPERTY ROMANCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The 2006 patent dispute in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C.,39 provides an object lesson in how property can be used 
as a rhetorical device to inveigh in favor of broad IP rights. 
MercExchange had successfully argued that eBay’s “Buy it 
Now” function violated its patent.40 eBay posed the question 
whether a permanent injunction should automatically follow 
this violation of MercExchange’s exclusive rights.41 Justice Sca-
lia unsurprisingly sought to recast the case in simpler terms, 
and invoked the language of property to do so.42 “[W]e’re talk-
ing about a property right,” said the Justice to eBay’s counsel 
 
 37. Cf. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 4–5 
(2d ed. 2003) (discussing constitutive metaphors); Diane Gurman, Why Lakoff 
Still Matters: Framing the Debate on Copyright Law and Digital Publishing, 
FIRST MONDAY, June 1, 2009, http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index 
.php/fm/article/view/2354/2210 (discussing how rhetorical frames can be used 
to push public dialogue about copyright in a progressive direction). 
 38. White, supra note 29, at 701 (“[O]rdinary language . . . provides a 
ground for challenge and change, a place to stand from which to reformulate 
any more specialized language. . . . Rhetorical analysis invites us to talk about 
our conceptions of ourselves as individuals and as communities, and to define 
our values in living rather than conceptual ways.”). 
 39. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 40. Id. at 390–91. 
 41. Id. at 391. 
 42. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130). 
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during oral arguments.43 “[A]ll he’s asking for is give me my 
property back.”44 
Justice Scalia’s invocation of property language in the eBay 
oral argument relies on a rhetorical move that I call “property 
romance.”45 This is a romantic belief in the essential unity of 
property, so that all forms of possession—whether the object is 
tangible or intangible, land or chattel, patent or copyright—can 
be understood in terms of the same basic rules and ideas. Part 
of this is a claim that the kinds of doctrines that govern owner-
ship of tangible things are essentially continuous with the doc-
trines that should govern intangibles.46 But here I address not 
this substantive aspect of the issue, but instead the attempt to 
use the language and emotional force of property as it is popu-
larly understood to resolve difficult questions of patent or copy-
right doctrine. This is just what Justice Scalia sought to do in 
the eBay argument: to use familiar ideas to reduce a complex 
issue about information regulation to a straightforward claim 
about the injustice of theft. 
Property romance emerges in a variety of IP settings. The 
briefing that preceded eBay provides one example. Justice Sca-
lia’s invocation of a big-tent vision of property in oral argument 
may have been due to the fact that the Property Rights Move-
ment (PRM)—a group traditionally devoted to defending lan-
downers whose ownership rights are threatened—enfolded pa-
tent holder MercExchange into its cause.47 Of course, the 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Cf. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public 
Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331 passim (2004) (invoking the notion of romance 
in connection with the public domain); Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the 
Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 429–33 (2002) (contrast-
ing “optimistic” private-property stories in the Demsetzian vein with “pessi-
mistic” private-property stories that stress public choice and interest group 
problems). 
 46. E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 118 (“[W]e should treat intellec-
tual and physical property identically in the law.”); I. Trotter Hardy, Not So 
Different: Tangible, Intangible, Digital, and Analog Works and Their Compar-
ison for Copyright Purposes, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 211, 213 (2001) (“For the 
purposes of intellectual property rules and regimes, there are no differences 
between intangible and tangible property.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Struc-
tural Unity of Real and Intellectual Property, PROGRESS ON POINT 13.24 
(Progress & Freedom Foundation, Aug. 2006), available at http://www.pff.org/ 
issues-pubs/pops/pop13.24RAE_9_26.pdf. 
 47. See Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130) (supporting strong 
protection of property rights). 
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ownership at issue in eBay seemed in many senses distinct 
from the kind of ownership the PRM usually defends.48 Merc-
Exchange wasn’t a small business threatened by an adverse 
zoning law or a homeowner faced with an eminent domain ac-
tion; it was the owner of an infringed-upon patent.49 Moreover, 
MercExchange was, in popular parlance, a “patent troll.”50 It 
did not engage in research or development, but merely acquired 
large numbers of patents—such as the one at issue in eBay—in 
the hope that one might turn out to be crucial to a big new ap-
plication, so that MercExchange could threaten the creator of 
that application with an injunction and extract a juicy settle-
ment.51 Yet the PRM, in the throes of property romance, 
brushed these distinctions aside. On the romantic view, the fact 
that small business proprietors, homeowners, and patent trolls 
alike share status as property owners is sufficient to render 
them roughly equal objects of concern. 
Consider as well the “cybertrespass” flap from a few years 
back. The internet explosion presented businesses with novel 
problems. Some had servers that were bombarded with spam.52 
Others were irritated that competitors culled facts from their 
sites via visits from unauthorized bots.53 In response, some 
businesses argued that the uninvited uses of their servers or 
websites were just like unauthorized uses of their personal 
property and amounted to an online iteration of the ancient 
 
 48. See Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of Intel-
lectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 
717–19 (observing the essential discontinuities between the PRM’s traditional 
constituency and the property rights in dispute in eBay). 
 49. Yuki Noguchi & Charles Lane, High Court Considers EBay Case on 
Patent, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2006, at D1. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stressing that 
the practical effect of the Court’s holding will be to mitigate the ability of pa-
tent acquirers to hold up purported infringers’ inventions in exchange for ex-
orbitant settlements); Eric Wesenberg & Peter O’Rourke, The Toll on the 
Troll: The Implications of eBay v. MercExchange, LAW.COM, May 22, 2006, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1147943132930 (discussing how patent 
trolls operate and using the eBay case as an example). 
 52. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 299–301 (Cal. 2003) (rejecting 
trespass to chattels claim based on defendant’s sending unauthorized e-mails 
to plaintiff ’s servers). 
 53. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069–70 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000) (holding that an action for trespass to chattels based on defendant’s 
sending unauthorized information-gathering programs to plaintiff ’s website 
had a reasonable likelihood of success, for the purposes of granting a prelimi-
nary injunction). 
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(and obscure) tort of trespass to chattels.54 The characteristic 
rhetorical simplicity of property romance captures this view 
perfectly, though courts have been divided in their reaction.55 
Of course, a property romantic would say spam and bot visits 
are trespasses to chattels. After all, the argument runs, proper-
ty is property. Owners of a site in cyberspace are like owners of 
a site in real space. And since you can’t just use or access some-
one’s personal possessions without their permission, neither 
can you use or access someone’s virtual possessions without 
their permission.56 Here too, property provides a rhetorical 
template from which one can work to resolve a difficult and 
novel problem raised by modern technology in easy and famili-
ar terms. 
A third site in which we can see property romance at work 
is in congressional debates about new copyright legislation.57 IP 
owners and pro-industry lobbyists testifying before Congress 
have a long history of using florid metaphors of all kinds.58 De-
 
 54. See id. (assessing plaintiff ’s trespass to chattels claim, but noting that 
it is unusual as a theory of liability); Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 302–03 (discussing 
the development of the trespass to chattels claim and its elements). 
 55. Compare Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 299–301 (denying cybertrespass claim), 
with eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (allowing cybertrespass claim), and Sotelo 
v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1229–33 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (allow-
ing contributory trespass to chattels claim based on sending unwanted adver-
tisements to plaintiff ’ s computer). 
 56. See Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 76 (2003) 
(“[T]he various equipment and facilities that make up the internet are 
not . . . real property. Rather, they are a new form of chattel, which are pre-
sumptively governed by the law of trespass to chattels.”); Richard Warner, 
Border Disputes: Trespass to Chattels on the Internet, 47 VILL. L. REV. 117, 120 
(2002) (analogizing real and intellectual property and arguing that trespass to 
chattels is an appropriate cause of action). 
 57. Property romance imbues debates about patent legislation as well. 
Those opposed to laws that would enable third world countries to acquire pa-
tented medicines via compulsory licenses have framed their arguments in 
terms of being for or against property generally. Ronald A. Cass, Patent Reme-
dy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118824874547 
610202.html (stating that those who endorse compulsory licenses “oppose pro-
tection of all property rights”); see also Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing 
Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1461515 (discussing rhetorical invocations of property in 
debates over global pharmaceutical sales). 
 58. Consider, for example, Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) 
President Jack Valenti’s famous “Boston Strangler” testimony: “I say to you 
that the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the 
Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.” Home Recording of Copyrighted 
Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, 
and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. 
of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1982). 
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bates about the passage of two major pieces of legislation affect-
ing copyright—the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA)59 
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)60—also in-
cluded dramatic moments, many of which relied on a romantic 
view of property as the basis for their appeal.61 Jack Valenti de-
fended the Motion Picture Association of America’s interest in 
just these terms: “We don’t want to shut down innova-
tion . . . . We just want to stop private property from being pil-
laged.”62 And even testimony that did not explicitly access 
property’s emotional appeal still relied on it as the constitutive 
metaphor for understanding the need for enhancing owners’ 
rights. Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters’ defense of the 
DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions invoked the familiar 
lock-and-key example that relies on equating information own-
ership with home ownership.63 The late Johnny Cash’s testi-
mony in defense of Title I of the DMCA epitomizes the easy eli-
sion of all forms of possession that characterizes property 
 
Even more amusing than Valenti’s overwrought metaphor is the fact that 
it turned out to be so utterly mistaken. The advent of the videotape medium 
actually turned out to diversify and expand the market for movies and has 
been an enormously lucrative development for the film industry. See Giovanna 
Fessenden, Peer-to-Peer Technology: Analysis of Contributory Infringement 
and Fair Use, 42 IDEA 391, 392–93 (2002). 
 59. Pub. L. No. 105-298, §§ 101–106, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827–29 (1998) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 60. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 61. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H10,620 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement 
of Rep. Jackson Lee) (“[The DMCA] demonstrates our commitment to protect-
ing the personal rights and property of American citizens.”); 144 CONG. REC. 
S12,378 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“In my view, prop-
erty is property whether it’s dirt or intangible.”). 
 62. Edmund Sanders & Jube Shiver, Jr., Digital TV Copyright Concerns 
Tentatively Resolved by Group, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002, at C5.  
 63. WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright 
Liability Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong. 49 (1997) (prepared testimony of Marybeth Peters, Register of 
Copyrights) (speaking on the need for the DMCA). 
It has long been accepted in U.S. law that the copyright owner has 
the right to control access to his work . . . . The bill would continue 
this basic premise, allowing the copyright owner to keep a work under 
lock and key and to show it to others selectively. Section 1201 has 
therefore been analogized to . . . a law against breaking and entering. 
Under existing law, it is not permissible to break into a locked room 
in order to make fair use of a manuscript kept inside. 
Id. 
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romance: “[O]ur laws respect what we create with our heads as 
much as what we build with our hands.”64 
Each of these examples illustrates more than the character 
of property romance as a rhetorical device. Property romance is 
almost invariably used to militate in favor of broadening copy-
right and patent owners’ rights. Invoking property not only 
provides a conceptual common ground to make arguments ac-
cessible, but possesses moral force as well. Framing an IP issue 
in the idiom of property imbues the debate with a very particu-
lar social meaning in which the owner is an aggrieved posses-
sor beset by wrongful takings. This enables a contrasting por-
trayal of those who seek to limit owners’ rights or exercise user 
privileges as pirates, or (probably worse, in America at least) 
communists.65 This Manichean dichotomy, however artificial,66 
makes it hard for anyone not to feel sympathetic to owners’ 
concerns. Some writers have even invoked religion in favor of 
owners’ rights. Author Susan Cheever invoked the Biblical in-
junction “thou shalt not steal” in resisting the idea that any 
taking or use of her copyrighted work of authorship was licit.67 
 
 64. Id. at 199 (statement of Johnny Cash). 
 65. In a 2005 interview, Bill Gates was asked if he believed that intellec-
tual property needed to be reformed. Gates answered that “there’s more that 
believe in intellectual property today than ever. There are fewer communists 
in the world today than there were. There are some new modern-day sort of 
communists who want to get rid of the incentive for musicians and moviemak-
ers and software makers under various guises.” Michael Kanellos, Gates Tak-
ing a Seat in Your Den, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 5, 2005, http://news.cnet.com/ 
Gates-taking-a-seat-in-your-den/2008-1041_3-5514121.html.  
 66. See Patricia Loughlan, ‘You Wouldn’t Steal a Car’: Intellectual Proper-
ty and the Language of Theft, 29 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 401, 403 (2007) 
(“The use of the term ‘pirate’ is clearly metaphorical and not even the most 
naïve of participants in the discourse of intellectual property could or would 
take it literally.”). Lawrence Lessig has also pointed out that the content in-
dustries most likely to invoke the notion of “piracy” to shame would-be users 
have themselves often taken liberally from the public domain and from other 
artists. For instance, Disney’s early iteration of the Mickey Mouse character, 
Steamboat Willie, was a very close imitation of Buster Keaton’s earlier audi-
ovisual work, Steamboat Bill, Jr. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 21–25 
(2004). 
 67. Susan Cheever, Just Google “Thou Shalt Not Steal,” NEWSDAY, May 
31, 2009, http://www.newsday.com/columnists/susan-cheever/just-google-thou 
-shalt-not-steal-1.531984. Harry Potter creator J.K. Rowling’s comments dur-
ing the infringement trial of a defendant who created an online guide to Rowl-
ing’s work were less melodramatic but still relied heavily on both the moral 
force of possession and property romance. “Are we or are we not the owners of 
our own work?” she asked during the trial. John A. Sellers, Rowling and RDR 
Meet in Court, PUBLISHERS WKLY., Apr. 17, 2008, http://www.publishersweekly 
.com/article/CA6552416.html. On the witness stand, Rowling compared the 
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Judges have done the same, solemnly beginning opinions hold-
ing that any sampling of sound recordings requires a licensing 
fee with the same imperious religious command.68 And academ-
ic writers who tend to use property romance also tend to prefer 
a high-protection vision of IP rights.69 
C. PROPERTY ANXIETY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Property romance possesses a simple and seductive appeal. 
It uses a familiar and ancient idea in order to make a claim 
that IP owners should be protected from theft (or piracy, or 
trespass, or something equally awful-sounding). But what rhe-
torical ground does this leave for those who seek to resist the 
encroaching privatization of information? In the early days of 
the internet, a few cyber-anarchists espoused the reductionist 
position that IP is simply not property, and it is still possible to 
find echoes of this idea in cyber-zines and on discussion 
boards.70 The hacker battle cry “information wants to be free” 
has also seeped into popular culture.71 But even to the extent 
that these aphorisms express an appealing ideal, they possess 
no real legal content. Information may want to be free, but if so, 
information is out of luck, because it is now and has for some 
time been heavily regulated.  
While most writers—even strong proponents of the public 
domain—would agree that IP is more or less a form of property, 
there remains substantial ambivalence about the issue.72 There 
 
“theft of her words to the removal of all the plums from a cake she might have 
baked.” Id. 
 68. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 
182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Exodus 20:15). 
 69. To take just one data point, all three of the authors of the brief asso-
ciated with the PRM in eBay tend to prefer strong protection of IP owners’ 
rights in their scholarly work. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property 
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703–04 (2001); R. 
Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the My-
thologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 997 (2003); Richard A. Epstein, 
Respect Bayer’s Patent: Cheap Cipro Now Could Cost Us Dearly in the Long 
Run, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2001, http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id= 
95001372. But cf. Chander & Sunder, supra note 45 (critiquing the public do-
main from a distributional perspective). 
 70. See, e.g., FreedomForIP.org, Thomas Jefferson on Why Copyrights and 
Patents Are Not Property, http://freedomforip.org/2007/10/31/thomas-jefferson 
-on-why-copyrights-and-patents-are-not-property/ (Oct. 31, 2007). 
 71. See Wagner, supra note 69, at 999 n.14. 
 72. Compare LESSIG, supra note 66, at 172 (“The issue is therefore not 
simply whether copyright is property. Of course copyright is a kind of ‘proper-
ty,’ and of course, as with any property, the state ought to protect it.”), with 
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is something in the equation of traditional and intellectual 
property that causes many writers profound unease, which I 
call “property anxiety.”73 Property anxiety is as conflicted and 
complex as property romance is simple and straightforward. 
This ambivalence comes from a number of directions. It is thus 
difficult to find a single thread that runs throughout property 
anxiety in the same way that property romance seems ani-
mated by a single unifying idea. Numerous writers lament the 
“propertization” of intellectual property.74 Examined more 
 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 187 (2001) (“[R]eal property doesn’t map directly onto in-
tellectual property. . . . [I]ntellectual property is a balanced form of property 
protection. I don’t have the right to fair use of your car; I do have the right to 
fair use of your book.”). See also Bill D. Herman, Breaking and Entering My 
Own Computer: The Contest of Copyright Metaphors, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 
231, 252 (2008) (observing that “free culture advocates are already anxious to 
unsettle the metaphor of property” as a way of describing intellectual proper-
ty). But see Michael A. Carrier, The Propertization of Copyright, in 1 INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 345, 350–56 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (arguing that applying 
property ideas to copyright can limit rather than expand owners’ rights). 
Other writers resist the equation of IP and property for a different reason. 
They argue that IP is a mere “privilege” that should not be equated with real 
and personal property because the latter categories have a longstanding, nat-
ural-rights character that is not shared by modern entitlements that are crea-
tures of statute. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success 
vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 
741, 763–64 (2001) (“[B]y invoking government power a copyright owner can 
impose prior restraint, fines, imprisonment, and confiscation on those engaged 
in peaceful expression and the quiet enjoyment of physical property. By thus 
gagging our voices, tying our hands, and demolishing our presses, copyright 
law would violate the very rights that Locke defended.”). 
 73. Cf. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 
108 YALE L.J. 601, 605–06 (1998) (discussing anxiety in popular conceptions of 
property). 
 74. E.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Crea-
tion, and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 504 (2007) (discussing the ten-
dency of propertization narratives of intellectual property to diminish author-
ship based on creative appropriation); Michael A. Carrier, Cabining 
Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (2004) 
(lamenting the “propertization” of IP as an “irreversible” trend that “sinks its 
tentacles further into public and corporate consciousness (as well as the IP 
laws) with each passing day”); Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: 
Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual 
Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 398 (1989) (expressing concern in the 
patent setting about the development of a “more proprietarian and anti-
dissemination attitude toward information than that which the law has pre-
viously displayed”); Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of 
Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 902 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, 
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY (1996)) (observing that the public character of information goods 
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closely, though, this notion expresses reservation about the ex-
pansion of private rights in information at the expense of the 
public domain.75 Since property is not coterminous with private 
property (but in fact includes many public forms like common 
and public property), it seems more accurate to characterize 
this strain in the literature as one that opposes privatization 
rather than propertization.  
It is easier to explore the character of property anxiety by 
looking not to explicit rejections of the idea of property in the IP 
setting, but rather by looking more closely at how critics of 
property romance frame their arguments. Many writers have 
questioned the coherence of the equation of physical and in-
tangible property that lies at the core of the cybertrespass cas-
es.76 Mark Lemley, for example, argued that the Cartesian pa-
radigm that applies well to real estate and to moveable objects 
simply makes no sense in the context of information goods.77 
Hence while we can say that one “enters” another’s land when 
someone crosses over the border of their property, “entering” a 
website means something entirely different—not physical inva-
sion but a mere request to a site to send data to a personal 
computer.78 Critics of the online incarnation of trespass to chat-
tels argue that these discontinuities are pervasive enough to 
render talking about information in the language of tangible 
property “faintly ludicrous.”79 
This descriptive point has normative implications. The 
claim that IP and property are essentially discontinuous leads 
to a related argument that framing debates about information 
regulation in terms of property language causes judges to apply 
the law in ways that misunderstand the character of intangible 
resources and degrade the public domain.80 Judicial reliance on 
 
“seems to suggest that propertization is a uniquely bad idea, precisely because 
the consumption of that good is ‘nonrivalrous’”). 
 75. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of 
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37–40 (2003) (describing 
the increasing trend toward creating private rights in information as a “second 
enclosure movement”). 
 76. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 527 
(2003). 
 77. Id. at 523. 
 78. Id. at 527–28. 
 79. Id. at 523. 
 80. See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital 
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 452 (2003) (“[J]udges, legislators, practi-
tioners, and lay people treat cyberspace as if it were a physical place. Examin-
ing how people discuss their online interactions, we find a vast amount of evi-
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an equation of physical space and cyberspace, the argument 
runs, prioritizes a form of reasoning about the latter that fails 
to account for the distinctive features of information regula-
tion.81 For example, IP more than physical property depends on 
preservation of large public commons in order to function effi-
ciently.82 Property anxiety suggests that an ownership-centered 
approach to regulating information goods fails to account for 
this fact, and that the net result will be judicial prioritization of 
claims of private possession even where those claims potential-
ly create an inefficient lockup of information that would be 
more efficiently held as a publicly available resource.83  
A related site of resistance to talking about IP in the lan-
guage of physical property looks past the coherence of the idea 
of property itself, or its effects on the behavior of judges and po-
 
dence that people think about online communications and transactions as oc-
curring in some place. This place may be inchoate and virtual, but no less real 
in our minds.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 80, at 483–84 (criticizing the Bidder’s 
Edge court for using trespass to chattels as a theory to hold liable the senders 
of unauthorized bots to an auction website); Lemley, supra note 76, at 528–33 
(critiquing judicial reliance on physical property rules like trespass in regulat-
ing information). But see David McGowan, The Trespass Trouble and the Me-
taphor Muddle, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 109 (2005) (reviewing opinions in cyber-
trespass cases and concluding that there is no evidence that analogizing 
cyberspace to real space will lead to flawed judicial decisionmaking). 
 82. See Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Re-
straints on the Government’s Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy 
or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 151 n.306 (2003) (“The [‘free as 
the air to common use’] analogy . . . conveys the importance of the public do-
main to sustain democratic living: just as air is essential for existence, so too is 
the public domain. The former sustains our physical needs; the latter, our 
mental and intellectual needs. People could not breathe without air, nor think 
freely without information that is available to all. The analogy also illumi-
nates the relationship between the public domain and the free flow of informa-
tion. Information in the public domain is meant to spread like the atmosphere, 
to flow freely for all to enjoy. Finally, the analogy suggests the strength that 
courts attributed to the constitutional restraint against government incursions 
of the public domain. For government to deplete the public domain or prevent 
the public’s access to it would be akin to the government attempting to take 
away a person’s ability to breathe.”). 
 83. Hunter, supra note 80, at 443–44 (arguing that approaching IP from a 
property perspective causes judges and policymakers to engage in “suboptimal 
and wasteful uses because the holders of the exclusion rights block the best 
use of the resource”); cf. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 
EMORY L.J. 367, 419 (1999) (noting that the trademark “has become its own-
er’s property not merely in a formal and limited sense, but in an ordinary and 
increasingly absolute sense,” which results in the mark’s being used “in cir-
cumstances entirely divorced from, and sometimes actually in conflict with, 
[the] mark’s informational role”). 
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licymakers, and focuses instead on the broader social implica-
tions of treating most information as subject to claims of pri-
vate right. Niva Elkin-Koren, for example, cautions that talk-
ing about information goods primarily in terms of property may 
cause us to change from a culture that freely trades in informa-
tion to one that regards information first and foremost as a 
commodity.84 Rhetoric is (as we have seen above) connected to 
reality.85 So regarding information as any other object-in-trade 
may discourage modes of production that are inspired by incen-
tives other than pecuniary gain. Artistic satires, political com-
mentaries, and religious tracts furnish historical examples, but 
the advent of the internet has caused this form of production to 
proliferate. Mash-ups posted on YouTube and Wikipedia en-
tries composed entirely of voluntary contributions provide just 
two illustrations of the means by which production takes place 
in the absence of profit motivation.86 Property anxiety’s reser-
vations about property talk derive in part from this sense that 
complete commodification of intellectual resources will choke 
off these burgeoning methods of production.87 
From all of these directions, property anxiety pushes back 
against the romantic view that physical property doctrine can 
provide a coherent template for thinking about intellectual 
property. Where property romance suggests that all forms of 
possession are essentially continuous, property anxiety seeks to 
disaggregate that claim, suggesting instead that physical and 
intangible property are essentially discontinuous. Whatever 
one thinks of the merits of this approach, property anxiety dif-
 
 84. Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private 
Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 378 
(2005). This concern echoes Margaret Radin’s articulation of the problems at-
tendant with treating certain objects, such as babies and organs, as goods in 
trade. Radin argues that “commodifying” these things—treating them as 
equivalent to other salable goods like chattels or land—robs them of their es-
sentially human qualities that transcend commercial status. Margaret Jane 
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1885–86 (1987) (“[T]o 
see the rhetoric of the market . . . as the sole rhetoric of human affairs is to 
foster an inferior conception of human flourishing.”). 
 85. Radin, supra note 84, at 1870 (“[A] world in which human interactions 
are conceived of as market trades is different from one in which they are not. 
Rhetoric is not just shaped by, but shapes, reality.”). 
 86. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 4–6 (2006) 
(discussing Wikipedia as an example of nonmarket production). 
 87. Lawrence Lessig, Re-crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HU-
MAN. 56, 79 (2006) (“[T]he concern is that the use of licenses to craft freedom 
may in turn affect the meaning of that freedom. . . . The focus on licenses may 
thus make that community less likely to engage in property-less creativity.”). 
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fers from property romance in that it lacks a powerful central 
theme that allows it to operate effectively as a rhetorical de-
vice. Although equating IP with familiar notions of possession 
allows listeners to access their own understanding of owner-
ship, property anxiety offers merely a series of complications 
that seek to undermine the conceptual coherence and practical 
wisdom of eliding corporeal and incorporeal forms of property.88  
This lack of a persuasive central theme matters because 
this debate is not merely an academic one over the nature of 
ownership. Just the contrary: property anxiety has a central 
place in debates over the appropriate scope of patent and copy-
right protection, and possesses a particular substantive va-
lence. Just as property romance correlates almost exclusively 
with a high-protection vision of the ideal scope of IP regulation, 
so does property anxiety correlate with a lower protection ap-
proach to this issue. Whether resisting judicial extension of 
trespass doctrine in online settings or legislative expansion of 
owners’ rights in information, the above examples indicate that 
property anxiety is used almost exclusively in resisting expan-
sions of private rights in information (or, conversely, in seeking 
to preserve the public domain). This is obviously not a coinci-
dence; rather, writers who express property anxiety fear that 
the imposition of an expansionist, romantic vision of property 
onto copyright and patent will lead inexorably to an expansion 
of owners’ rights and a correlative diminishment of the public 
domain. Given the current limited use of the idea of property in 
debates over the scope of IP protection, this fear is likely well-
founded. In the following Part, though, I question the central 
assumption underlying both property romance and property 
anxiety, and lay the foundation for an approach to thinking 
about IP as property that is not inimical to the public domain. 
 
 88. To some extent, property anxiety offers counter-rhetoric that operates 
within the romantic property paradigm. Most familiar is the notion of the “in-
formation commons” that seeks to emphasize the extent to which many infor-
mation resources remain accessible to the public. As I explain later, while 
building on our understanding of physical property to understand intellectual 
property is an appealing project, the term “information commons” is mislead-
ing because it suggests a form of limited, shared ownership rather than unre-
gulated public access. See infra note 146. 
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II.  MYTH AND REALITY IN PROPERTY RHETORIC   
A. THE PERVASIVE POWER OF PROPERTY RHETORIC 
As we have seen, rhetoric, as a form of legal reasoning, 
represents an attempt to persuade members of a polity about 
what the good life is (or should be) using an appeal to a set of 
common understandings.89 This is precisely what is at play in 
using the language of property when talking about copyright 
and patent. To say “owners of copyrights and patents enjoy cer-
tain statutorily enumerated exclusive rights, though those 
rights are subject to other statutorily enumerated user privi-
leges” is a far less effective rhetorical appeal than to simply say 
“patents and copyrights are their owners’ property.” To take the 
point one level further, the latter phrasing epitomizes a consti-
tutive rhetorical approach to legal reasoning.90 Invoking the no-
tion of property in dialogues about IP is not just an attempt to 
trick listeners into supporting a particular policy, but aims to 
convince the public that IP actually is a form of property large-
ly indistinguishable from chattels or land. Thus the rhetorical 
power of using property ideas in an IP context lies just beneath 
the surface of the appeal itself. Property romance does not ex-
plicitly claim that IP and property are essentially continuous, 
but merely by assuming that this is the case, manages to access 
the force that property holds over the popular mind. 
Property anxiety responds to the rhetorical force of proper-
ty romance by attempting to undermine the coherence of the 
assumptions that lie beneath it. The essential thrust of proper-
ty anxiety is that by equating a less-familiar notion (informa-
tion regulation) with a more familiar one (physical property), 
the latter tends to dominate the imagination, eliding crucial 
distinctions between the two. Justice Cardozo warned that 
“[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as 
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.”91 
Much as Cardozo warned about the seductive character of rhe-
torical appeals, friends of the public domain similarly assert 
that property romance is a foundationally flawed rhetorical de-
 
 89. See supra Part I.A. 
 90. Cf. Patricia Loughlan, Pirates, Parasites, Reapers, Sowers, Fruits, 
Foxes . . . The Metaphors of Intellectual Property, 28 SYDNEY L. REV. 211, 212 
(2006) (comparing overtly descriptive metaphors with constitutive metaphors 
that more subtly express one thing in terms of another). 
 91. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). Cardozo’s 
observation itself uses liberation and slavery as a constitutive metaphor for 
vivifying its warning about using metaphor in legal reasoning. Id. 
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vice because it fails to account for essential differences between 
the objects governed by the two fields, such as rivalrousness 
and excludability.92 
But however much property romance and property anxiety 
may take diametrically opposed views on the appropriate role 
that property rhetoric has in debates over the proper scope of 
IP protection, they do agree on the social meaning that proper-
ty possesses in these debates. As we have seen, property rom-
ance and property anxiety alike assume that using property 
ideas in discussing copyright and patent protection is invaria-
bly an expansionist move. While these approaches dispute the 
continuousness of physical property with copyright and patent, 
they each share the assumption that if information were regu-
lated much as corporeal property is, the result would be a go-
vernance regime characterized by largely inviolable entitle-
ments and a nearly total degree of owner control.93 
But why do all of these writers assume that property nec-
essarily entails a nearly total suite of ownership entitlements? 
After all, lawyers learn as first-year students that property is 
merely a legal relationship. We are taught not to confuse the 
idea of property with the objects of ownership, and we have to 
get our minds around the initially counterintuitive notion that 
property establishes relationships between people with respect 
to things.94 This idea seems counterintuitive because property 
means something very different in the popular mind than it 
does to lawyers.95 In common American parlance, to say that 
 
 92. See Boyle, supra note 75, at 41–42 (2003) (arguing that the distin-
guishing features of information as property are nonrivalrousness and nonex-
cludability). 
 93. See Herman, supra note 72, at 245 (arguing that “if copyright is a real 
property right, [an owner] gets near total control over how [his/her works of 
authorship are] used”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic 
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 286 (1996) (expressing concern that as cul-
tural expression increasingly becomes regarded as a commodity of trade, the 
result will be “broad proprietary rights [in information] that extend to every 
conceivable valued use”).  
 94. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 13 
(1927); A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 
128–30 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (emphasizing that ownership describes relations 
between persons and other persons, not between persons and objects of owner-
ship). 
 95. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 
97–100, 113–67 (1977); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 
XXII NOMOS: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 
1980) (“In the English-speaking countries today, the conception of property 
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something is your property is to claim dominion and control 
over it,96 and likely also to express that the thing over which 
you assert ownership has some dignitary connection to your 
identity.97 And it is this view of property—rather than the for-
mal legal definition of the institution—that gives property 
romance its formidable force. One of the foundational ways of 
thinking about property, and the way that prevails in the popu-
lar mind, is what scholars have called the “ownership model” of 
property.98 This conception of property emphasizes owners’ 
rights to use, exclude, and transfer as both natural and inevit-
able. The classic touchstone for this idea is Blackstone’s de-
scription of property as “that sole and despotic dominion which 
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in 
the universe.”99 Though even property enthusiasts acknowledge 
that the institution admits of some limits on owners’ preroga-
tives,100 the equation of property with nearly absolute rights 
continues to dominate the popular imagination.101 The power of 
 
held by the specialist (the lawyer or economist) is quite different from that 
held by the ordinary person.”). 
 96. See Grey, supra note 95, at 69 (“Most people, including most special-
ists in their unprofessional moments, conceive of property as things owned by 
persons. To own property is to have exclusive control of something—to be able 
to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, leave it idle, or destroy it. Legal 
restraints on the free use of one’s property are conceived as departures from 
an ideal conception of full ownership.”). 
 97. See Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
957, 959 (1982). 
 98. E.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred 
Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 
1061, 1085 (2005) (using this term). 
 99. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 
(photo. reprint 1979) (1765–69).  
 100. See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, Blackstone’s Theory of the “Absolute” Rights 
of Property, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 67, 85 (1985) (“Although private property is 
said to be an absolute right, the protection of which is a primary aim of gov-
ernment, absolute rights are largely sacrificed for the blessings of civil socie-
ty.”); Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Fron-
tiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803, 805 (2001) (calling Blackstone’s “despotic dominion” 
phrasing an “injudicious overgeneralization”). 
 101. See Milton C. Regan Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations 
and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2338–39 (1994) (“[P]roperty rhetoric 
is comprised of diverse strands that co-exist in some tension, rather than form-
ing a unified and harmonious whole. Nonetheless, certain strands have had 
particularly powerful influence on the cultural imagination, and together con-
stitute what we might describe as the mythology of property.”). 
The best anecdotal illustration I’ve seen of this point is the stridently pro-
owner version of Woody Guthrie’s populist song “This Land Is Your Land” that 
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this view of property is unsurprising. Emphasizing owners’ to-
tal control fits neatly with the tradition of liberal individualism 
that animates the American consciousness. To regard property 
owners as rightful, deserving possessors suggests that they me-
rit freedom from government regulation, and also serves to 
downplay the moral significance of America’s vast disparities in 
wealth distribution.102 
The ownership discourse provides the background assump-
tion animating much property scholarship as well,103 even 
though lawyers are aware that the popular notion of property 
absolutism does not match the complexity of the positive law of 
property. Richard Pipes, for example, characterizes property as 
“the right of the owner or owners, formally acknowledged by 
public authority, both to exploit assets to the exclusion of eve-
ryone else and to dispose of them by sale or otherwise.”104 Most 
American courts share this assumption, elevating property 
owners’ rights over claims even to constitutional freedoms like 
speech105 or religion.106 The prevalence of the ownership dis-
course in the Anglo-American tradition results in a view of 
property strongly imbued with moral overtones, so that claims 
of ownership over land or chattels possess force in the popular 
mind as well as in legal settings.107 
 
is (apparently) popular among schoolchildren: “This land is my land/And it 
ain’t your land/I got a shotgun/And you don’t got one/If you don’t get off/I’ll 
blow your head off/This land is private property.” This song appeared in the 
1992 film Bob Roberts, and came to my attention when it was quoted in Joan 
Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 280 (1998). 
 102. Cf. DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, at 
xiii (1991) (observing the American tendency to embrace explanations that 
look to “the classical ideology of liberal individualism” rather than looking to 
material causes). 
 103. See Williams, supra note 101, at 284–89 (pointing out that while law-
yers pay lip service to resisting the “absolutism” that characterizes the popu-
lar view of ownership, this approach to thinking about property still domi-
nates academic writing on the subject). 
 104. RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM, at xv (1999).  
 105. See A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chi. Typographical Union No. 16, 83 N.E. 
940, 944–45 (Ill. 1908) (upholding injunction against striking workers on the 
theory that business owners had a property right to preclude protests). But cf. 
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (upholding the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court’s construction of the state constitution to require own-
ers of private shopping centers to allow certain kinds of speech on the premis-
es). 
 106. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 458 
(1988) (holding that the federal government’s title to property trumps Native 
American interests in holding religious rites on the same land). 
 107. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of 
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B. THE PERSISTENT MYTH OF PROPERTY ABSOLUTISM 
It is thus understandable that both property romance and 
property anxiety proceed on the assumption that talking about 
IP in the language of traditional property will yield a broader 
view of owners’ copyright and patent protections. After all, the 
ownership discourse on which each of these perspectives relies 
is the prevalent way of thinking about property in American 
culture (although not necessarily within the legal academy). 
Yet this one-sided approach to property is more myth than real-
ity. What property romance and anxiety each miss is that there 
are not one, but many discourses of property, and that the own-
ership discourse is only one way to talk about what possession 
means. A counter-narrative to this way of thinking deempha-
sizes the centrality of owners and instead regards property as a 
system that structures social relationships with resources. This 
alternative view—what I’ll call the “social discourse of proper-
ty”—suggests that focusing primarily on private, individual 
ownership ignores the full range of functions served by proper-
ty and blinds us to the ways that property is a communal insti-
tution that creates and depends on social relationships.108 Of 
particular relevance for this investigation, the social discourse 
of property stresses that “property” is not coterminous with 
private property, but instead includes common and public 
forms of property that often prove to be superior ways of regu-
lating resources.  
This latter idea has deep historical roots. Although Black-
stone’s well-worn “despotic dominion” phrasing is often trotted 
out to suggest the historical primacy of an individualist view of 
property,109 the earliest property regimes employed mixtures of 
public, common, and private possession, ceding some land for 
private ownership while reserving other portions for public use. 
These included public property that was available for anyone to 
 
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007). 
 108. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF 
PROPERTY 95–139 (2000) (discussing property as a system of social relations 
that accounts for the rights of owners as well as the interests of nonowners); 
cf. Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 36, 36–37 (Stephen R. Munzer 
ed. 2001) (surveying the work of writers who conceive of property as a system 
of social relations rather than solely as ownership and exclusion). 
 109. Nor, in context, does it accurately reflect Blackstone’s own ideas. In 
fact, Blackstone devoted the 518 pages of his treatise following the hoary “des-
potic dominion” phrasing to qualifying that definition. See Williams, supra 
note 101, at 281. 
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use (such as Roman roads and watercourses) and common 
property that was subject to the limited use and exclusion 
rights of a particular group (such as the English village com-
mon, which was accessible by any villager but not by outsid-
ers).110 Indeed, the public trust tradition that animates modern 
environmental law traces to Justinian’s Code.111 And the feudal 
ownership system that predated Blackstone was characterized 
not by atomistic notions of possession, but by a system of over-
lapping relationships with resources so that “many per-
sons . . . [could] say, each with as much justification as the oth-
er, ‘That is my field!’”112 The legal realists of the early 
twentieth century echoed this idea, characterizing property as 
an essentially social institution that links various individuals 
in relationship to a given resource.113 
Theorists have articulated the social discourse of property 
in a variety of ways. In this Article, I focus on four particular 
features that distinguish this approach.114 To begin, the social 
discourse is premised on a foundationally different vision of 
property than the ownership discourse. The ownership dis-
course is about individuals possessing objects in the interest of 
maximizing private wealth. The social discourse takes a broad-
er view, instead seeing property as a system of social relations 
in which a variety of actors have overlapping interests in things 
and resisting the notion that individual wealth maximization is 
property’s telos.115 The social discourse’s iconic case is State v. 
Shack,116 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court required an 
owner to permit social service providers onto his land in order 
 
 110. See Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the 
Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 422 (1995). 
 111. J. INST. 2.1 & 2.2; see William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the 
Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, 
and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 
395 (1997) (citing Justinian’s Code as the forerunner of public trust doctrine).  
 112. MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 113–16 (L.A. Manyon trans., Univer-
sity of Chicago Press 1961); see also Williams, supra note 101, at 290–91 (dis-
cussing the variety of social obligations and entitlements with respect to land 
in the Middle Ages). 
 113. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 357, 361 (1954).  
 114. This is not meant to be an exhaustive description of theories of proper-
ty that may fall within the social discourse. I seek only to identify the strains 
that are particularly relevant to this discussion. 
 115. See Munzer, supra note 108, at 38–44 (cataloguing eight principles 
that reflect the core tenets of the view of property as a system of social rela-
tions). 
 116. 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). 
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to treat resident workers. The Court did not simply ignore the 
owner’s interests, but merely held that they were overborne by 
the importance of maintaining resident workers’ access to so-
cial services.117 Some theories within the social discourse tradi-
tion go a step further, suggesting not only that owners’ rights 
are limited by competing social considerations, but that owners 
have affirmative duties to care for their land. Cultural property 
theorists, for example, have shown that other cultures regard 
their relation to land not in terms of domination and use, but in 
terms of stewardship—a duty to respect and care for the 
earth.118 This view finds expression in modern American law as 
well, most notably the public trust doctrine, which imposes on 
government a fiduciary duty of care over natural resources for 
the good of the beneficial owner of those resources, the pub-
lic.119 
Second, the ownership discourse focuses primarily on pri-
vate property. Although writers within this tradition acknowl-
edge, as they must, the existence of public and common forms 
of property, their work tends to emphasize the centrality of pri-
vately owned land and chattels.120 By contrast, the social dis-
course of property does not prioritize any particular form of 
 
 117. Id. at 372 (“Property rights serve human values. They are recognized 
to that end, and are limited by it. Title to real property cannot include domi-
nion over the destiny of persons the owner permits to come upon the premis-
es.”). 
 118. See generally Kristen Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 
YALE L.J. 1022, 1067–77 (2009) (discussing stewardship). 
 119. See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006) 
(seeking to maintain historic properties by limiting development that would 
adversely affect them); see also Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in 
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 
485–89 (1970). 
 120. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. 
ECON. REV. 347, 354–59 (1967) (arguing that conversion of public or common 
land to private property is almost always normatively attractive); cf. Richard 
A. Epstein, What Light If Any Does the Google Print Dispute Shed on Intellec-
tual Property Law?, 7 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 9–11 (2006) (conceding 
only “a small, and shrinking place, for some fair use defense” in copyright 
law).  
Recently proposed IP legislation also exhibits this failure to recognize the 
centrality of public as well as private forms of property. The Prioritizing Re-
sources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 is known by the 
salubrious acronym “The PRO-IP Act.” This falsely makes the legislation 
sound as though it were designed to protect all intellectual property, when it 
actually represents a strengthening of only private rights in information via 
stronger penalties for and enhanced enforcement of infringement. See PRO-IP 
Act of 2008, H.R. 4279, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008). 
  
680 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:652 
 
possession, instead acknowledging the simultaneous presence 
of different kinds of property ownership such as commonly held 
resources, public lands, and novel alternatives like limited 
common property regimes.121 The social discourse of property 
also includes a wider range of objects within its definition of 
property, while the ownership discourse remains primarily con-
cerned with land and chattels. The New Property movement of 
the 1960s represents the high-water mark of the former ap-
proach.122 At its peak, the movement convinced the Supreme 
Court to regard public assistance as a form of property entitle-
ment.123 Courts have since backed off this expansive view, but 
writers within the social discourse continue to press the boun-
daries of what constitutes property. Recent work has, for ex-
ample, sought to extend the application of property law to envi-
ronmental services,124 self-expression,125 and racial identity.126 
Third, and closely related, the social discourse of property 
emphasizes the efficiency values of public as well as private 
property. The ownership discourse tends to focus on the value 
of private ownership in generating social value. Harold Dem-
setz laid the foundation for this approach by arguing that as 
the value of any resource grows, private property in that re-
source will emerge.127 The social discourse differs insofar as it 
considers more fully how public resources contribute to the effi-
ciency of property regimes. Carol Rose has shown that property 
systems require the presence of common or public resources as 
well as private ones in order to reach optimal outcomes.128 To 
 
 121. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Property: Correcting the Half-Truths, 
PLAN. & ENVTL. L., Dec. 10, 2007, at 3, 7 (observing the public/private charac-
ter of property entitlements). See generally Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures 
of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 
83 MINN. L. REV. 129 (1998) (discussing limited common property regimes). 
 122. See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 
(1964) (articulating a broad vision of property that would extend to intangibles 
like labor or state entitlements beyond real property and chattels). 
 123. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 124. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification 
of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 614–16 (2000) (analyzing the 
role of currency selection in environmental trading markets). 
 125. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality 
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 
1533, 1535–39 (1993). 
 126. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 
1714–15 (1993). 
 127. See Demsetz, supra note 120, at 354–59. 
 128. See Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game 
Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 51 
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take a familiar example, dedication of roads for common use—
even when they transect otherwise private tracts of land—
enables commerce so that goods produced on those private 
lands can be taken to market.129  
Finally, the social discourse of property calls attention to 
the nonmarket ways in which property creates social welfare. 
This theme is largely absent in the ownership discourse, which 
tends to equate the creation of value only with private wealth 
maximization, overlooking the generation of value that is not 
readily commodifiable. For example, public squares create a ga-
thering space that enables individual interactions between 
members of a community and enriches civic identity.130 Nation-
al parks provide for shared experiences of wonder that can 
create bonds between otherwise disparate members of socie-
ty.131 Other writers who fit broadly within this social discourse 
stress the extent to which the experience of ownership can em-
power the dispossessed,132 or enhance freedom by enabling in-
dividuals to more fully realize their basic human capabilities.133 
In each of these cases, the social discourse seeks a broader de-
finition of property’s value than the purely economic vision as-
sociated with the ownership discourse. 
This alternative story about property reveals itself in doc-
trine as well as the academic literature. A quick glance at his-
torical and modern property law belies property absolutism, in-
stead revealing a suite of rights riddled with exceptions and 
 
(1990) (observing that a property system itself is a public good). 
 129. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and In-
herently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 756 (1986) (arguing that 
roads and watercourses function better as public rather than private resources 
in order to enable travel and commerce). 
 130. Id. at 775–80 (discussing the socializing effects of property); cf. 
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1911–12 
(2005) (discussing the extent to which acquisition of property enables and re-
flects humans’ inherent tendency toward sociability). 
 131. Cf. Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions 
of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 
108–09 (2003) (discussing res divini juris, a Roman category of property that 
included sacred sites that were considered public in order to reflect their 
common importance to all citizens). 
 132. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY 
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) 
(suggesting that capitalism’s failure in developing countries could be reversed 
by investing the poor with property rights in their material possessions). 
 133. See AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 501–30 (2002) (dis-
cussing the capability of market-based property systems to enhance freedom 
by creating more individual autonomy). 
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limitations on owners’ rights. The rule against perpetuities im-
poses temporal limits on an owner’s ability to bequeath proper-
ty.134 Nuisance laws have long constrained an owner’s preroga-
tive to engage in certain property uses that may prove harmful 
to his neighbors.135 Easements and covenants that run with the 
land require owners to put up with uses that have been estab-
lished by previous generations.136 Modern property owners ex-
perience these ancient restrictions in addition to a host of more 
recent ones. Environmental regulations, eminent domain, and 
civil rights laws all constrain the way in which landowners can 
use their land and the extent to which they can exclude others 
from it.137 Law even imposes certain affirmative duties on own-
ers, such as property taxes or (in some jurisdictions) obligations 
to develop their land in particular ways imposed by aesthetic 
zoning laws. And while we normally think of property law as 
establishing and defending the rights of private owners, the 
state also regulates and protects shared ownership interests as 
well. Federal law preserves vast tracts of land for public use 
(such as, for example, our national parks), and state law can be 
enlisted to enforce violations of common forms of ownership 
(such as trespassing on land held by a condominium association 
for its members).  
The foregoing discussion shows that for all their differenc-
es, property romance and property anxiety share a common 
flaw: they are rooted in an impoverished view of what property 
means. By assuming that the equation of intellectual property 
and physical property will necessarily result in an absolutist, 
owner-dominated view of copyright and patent, both property 
romance and property anxiety understate the complexity of 
ownership, and in particular fail to account for the significant 
 
 134. See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1990), available 
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/usrap90.htm (invalidating 
interests that vest later than twenty-one years after some life in being from 
the time of their creation). The Rule dates to The Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 
(1681) 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch.).  
 135. Both public and private law trace their development to medieval Eng-
land. In William Aldred’s Case, for example, the plaintiff complained that his 
neighbor’s pigsty caused unhealthy odors such that Aldred could not come and 
go without being subjected to continuous annoyance. Aldred’s Case, (1610) 77 
Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B.). Aldred prevailed. Id. 
 136. The rule that covenants are enforceable against subsequent owners 
only under certain conditions also has its origins in the common law of the 
Middle Ages. See Spencer’s Case, (1582) 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B.). 
 137. See Carrier, supra note 74, at 54–80 (compiling a similar compendium 
of restrictions on property owners’ rights). 
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counterpoint of the social discourse of property. In the next 
Part, I take this point one step further and show not only that 
there is something important missing from the current scholar-
ly debate, but that what is missing—the social discourse of 
property—actually provides both the best descriptive account 
for what it means to think of IP as property and a promising 
rhetorical strategy for balancing public and private interests in 
information goods. 
III.  PROPERTY RHETORIC FOR THE PUBLIC DOMAIN   
A. EXPLAINING IP THROUGH THE SOCIAL DISCOURSE OF 
PROPERTY 
The previous Part showed that property is a capacious idea 
that includes the notion of ownership as exclusion as well as a 
system of social relations. In this Part, I take this point one 
step further and show that the social discourse of property pro-
vides a superior idiom in which to talk about patent and copy-
right. We have seen that the social discourse of property differs 
from the dominant ownership discourse in four primary ways. 
Proceeding through each of these points shows how the social 
discourse of property provides a better account than the owner-
ship discourse for understanding the distinctive way in which 
the products of creation and innovation count as forms of prop-
erty. 
To begin, the central premises that underlie the social dis-
course of property are more consonant with copyright and pa-
tent law than are those underlying the ownership discourse. 
The latter view regards the property relation as binary and ex-
clusive: one individual (or limited group of individuals, or a 
corporation) owns an object to the exclusion of all others.138 Yet 
while we call the possessor of a copyright or patent an “owner,” 
this person looks nothing like the solitary despot of Black-
stone’s caricature. Rather, the res in IP is a site at which the 
interests of various actors—titleholders and non-titleholders 
alike—converge. If I own the copyright in a work of authorship 
 
 138. See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997) (“[T]he law 
of property is driven by an analysis which takes the perspective of exclusion, 
rather than one which elaborates a right to use.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Proper-
ty and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (“[T]he right to 
exclude others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of 
property—it is the sine qua non. Give someone the right to exclude others from 
a valued resource . . . and you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion 
right and they do not have property.”). 
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or the patent for a device, my entitlements are subjected to the 
interests of previous authors or inventors (because the only 
protectable elements of intellectual property are those that are 
novel—in the case of patent—or original—in the case of copy-
right—advancements over prior work); contemporary authors 
or inventors (insofar as they are permitted to use the work or 
device subject to the fair use or experimental use doctrines); the 
original author of a work of authorship (as where the Visual 
Artists’ Rights Act prevents owners from mutilating or misat-
tributing works); and the public at large (to the extent that the 
public has a future interest in the device or work of authorship 
that will vest when it becomes part of the public domain). 
Second, the central role that public and common resources 
play in the social discourse of property aligns with the impor-
tance of public as well as private property in our intellectual 
property system. The idea of private ownership of information 
as an incentive to create is obviously integral to patent and 
copyright law. But these private rights in information exist 
alongside and in symbiosis with public rights in information. 
Indeed, the public domain—a site of information that is largely 
unregulated and available for the public to use at no charge—
has occupied a central place in federal IP law since the incep-
tion of the republic.139 The earliest patent and copyright sta-
tutes created very narrow exclusive rights so that protected 
material would become generally available to the public as soon 
as fourteen years after vesting.140 The identification of society 
as the ultimate benefactor of IP regulation finds its roots in the 
Constitution’s relatively limited extension of congressional au-
thority to create “exclusive rights” only for “limited times” and 
with the aim of furthering “Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”141 Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the 
aim of federal IP law is to create a rich public domain, with pri-
vate owners’ wealth a secondary consideration.142  
Since the eighteenth century, then, intellectual “property” 
has referred not only to privately owned information, but to the 
 
 139. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (fourteen-year term); Copyright 
Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (fourteen-year term plus possible additional 
fourteen-year term upon application). 
 140. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7; Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15. 
 141. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 142. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 
511 (1917) (“[T]his court has consistently held that the primary purpose of our 
patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents 
but is ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts.’”). 
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public domain—itself a form of property, albeit a public one—as 
well.143 In fact, any coherent account of intellectual property 
must constantly invoke public forms of ownership as well as the 
private forms with which they exist concurrently.144 The specif-
ic expression contained in a novel—the literary work, not the 
physical book itself—is private property, in many ways subject 
to the owner’s control just as a plot of land would be. However, 
that work of authorship is shot through with elements that do 
not lie within the owner’s control, and have been dedicated to 
the public. The ideas that animate the work remain free for the 
public to use, and even proprietary elements of the work can be 
accessed by the public in an easement-like fashion so long as 
they amount to fair uses as defined by section 107 of the Copy-
right Act.145 And once a copyrighted or patented work passes 
the applicable time horizon, it ceases to have any private ele-
ments at all, instead becoming a fully unregulated resource, as 
open to the public as the high seas or interstate highways.146  
 
 143. Despite this, the public domain has emerged as a subject of attention 
in legal scholarship only quite recently. Jessica Litman’s The Public Domain, 
39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990), is probably the earliest contemporary example. 
 144. Cf. Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copy-
right Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 649, 653 (2007) (stating that IP regimes create 
“semicommons—a complex mix of private property rights and commons”). We 
see examples of this in the physical world as well. For example, many national 
parks include churches, which cannot be owned by the government for Estab-
lishment Clause reasons. Title to these churches is held by their respective 
religions, though the surrounding land (and access to the churches them-
selves) remains owned by the federal government. Similarly, the federal gov-
ernment has ceded some degree of ownership and control over traditional Na-
tive American sacred sites to the tribe members for whom those sites have 
particular significance. Access to each of these religious sites is the product of 
agreements between the government and the churches. See generally IN THE 
LIGHT OF REVERENCE (PBS Film Aug. 14, 2001). 
 145. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). The government also condemns easements 
across private property in order to construct public roads, creating a different 
kind of public/private hybrid form of property. Some scholars have suggested 
that fair use of copyrighted works (and possibly also the research defense to 
patent infringement) are much like public use easements over otherwise pri-
vately owned resources. Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, 
and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intel-
lectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 41 (1998) (com-
paring fair use to a public easement); Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Proper-
ty, and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 675, 712–13 (1993) (same). 
 146. I want to stress that these examples—like the public domain itself—
are instances of public property. The frequent use of the term “information 
commons” to refer to the public domain is somewhat misleading, because 
commons were subject to limited property rights. See Rose, supra note 129, at 
740. Village greens in early modern England, for example, were subject to li-
mited exclusion rights (villagers could enter but outsiders could not) and li-
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Third, the social discourse of property also fits well with 
the Anglo-American intellectual property tradition in that both 
emphasize the efficiency of public forms of property. The tax-
onomy of ownership forms described above is functional as well 
as descriptive. Roman roads and English village greens sought 
to maximize efficiency by assuring that the public (or certain 
subsets of it) had access to the means of transportation or agri-
cultural resources that were necessary to the production of 
goods for the marketplace.147 Similarly, the existence of the 
public domain generates socially optimal outcomes by assuring 
that sufficient cultural material remains available for the crea-
tion of future works.148 The time-limited character of exclusive 
patent and copyright privileges reflects the concern that allow-
ing any inventor or creator absolute ownership would be coun-
terproductive, and sits ill-at-ease with IP owners’ claims of 
complete control over their work.149 This is particularly true 
because the full social value of creative or inventive work can 
only be realized by enabling others to use it.150 Locking up all 
rights in a single owner for an indefinite period of time may 
preclude high-value uses that benefit society overall, rather 
than just a single actor.151 Protected information reverts to the 
public domain both to allow the public to use that information 
in creating future work, and also to compensate the public for 
owners’ partial appropriation from the public domain in the 
 
mited use rights (some greens could be used exclusively for grazing, others on-
ly for growing crops). Cf. id. The public domain is thus not really a “commons,” 
but public property: a largely unregulated space to which all are welcome, sub-
ject to other legal restraints. See Rose, supra note 131, at 93–105 (contrasting 
Roman property law categories res communes with res publicae).  
 147. See Rose, supra note 129, at 723 (observing the “service to commerce” 
generated by inherently public property, and explaining that “here, the com-
mons was not tragic, but comedic, in the classical sense of a story with a happy 
outcome”). Admittedly, there is much debate over the efficiency of some public 
resources. See id. at 715–16. The English village green and the related enclo-
sure movement provided the central metaphor for one of the most famous cri-
tiques of public and common property, The Tragedy of the Commons. Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1242 (1968). 
 148. See Rose, supra note 131, at 102. 
 149. See id. at 104. 
 150. See id. at 102. 
 151. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
1799, 1809 (2000) (observing that it is difficult to predict which creative work 
will advance progress, which militates in favor of time-limited exclusive 
rights). 
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first instance.152 The limited nature of copyright and patent 
owners’ prerogatives—comprising only a modest number of ex-
clusive rights and subject to various user-oriented use privileg-
es153—during the exclusive rights period further ensures that 
there is enough public access to protected work to maintain a 
robust exchange in ideas.154 The productivity of the IP system 
thus depends as much on availability of resources to the public 
as it does on incentives for private owners to invest in creation 
and invention. The duality of this efficiency story meshes better 
with the social discourse of property, in which public and pri-
vate resources depend on each other to maximize social 
wealth,155 than with the ownership discourse of property, which 
stresses almost exclusively the efficiency of private owner-
ship.156  
The final reason that the social discourse of property is a 
superior language in which to express the character of intangi-
ble resources as property is that it accounts for the many non-
market benefits generated by inventive and creative processes. 
As discussed above, patent and copyright law generate econom-
ic efficiency insofar as they comprise a system that maximizes 
the production of information goods to be sold in traditional 
marketplaces.157 But as the social discourse of property 
stresses, this is not the only kind of value generated by the in-
stitution. Possession can enhance community, generate civic 
 
 152. Cf. Litman, supra note 143, at 966 (“[T]he very act of authorship in 
any medium is more akin to translation and recombination than it is to creat-
ing Aphrodite from the foam of the sea.”) (emphasis omitted); SPIDER ROBIN-
SON, MELANCHOLY ELEPHANTS 16 (1985) (“Artists have been deluding them-
selves for centuries with the notion that they create. In fact they do nothing of 
the sort.”). In light of the content of this footnote, I really should note that I 
found the Robinson quotation not in reading his work, but because it is the ep-
igram for the Litman piece cited just beforehand. 
 153. Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 337 
(2002) (“The copyright statute doesn’t give copyright owners the exclusive 
right to use their works for limited times, or the exclusive right to exploit their 
works commercially for limited times. Instead, it gives copyright owners the 
exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute to the public and publicly per-
form or display their works, subject to a host of statutory exceptions.”). 
 154. See Frischmann, supra note 144, at 673 (arguing that the “leaks” that 
characterize copyright owners’ entitlements are critical to maintaining alloca-
tive efficiency); Lemley, supra note 22, at 1058 (arguing that total control for 
IP owners would undermine the efficiency of the copyright and patent sys-
tems). 
 155. See Lemley, supra note 22, at 1072–73. 
 156. See id. at 1037. 
 157. See id. at 1072. 
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pride, and foster cultural interchange.158 Copyright and patent 
also generate value far in excess of the dollar value associated 
with the information goods whose production they encourage.159 
Works of authorship are not valuable only because they are 
part of an exchange in which authors get royalties for book 
sales, but because songs and literature provide a common lan-
guage that allows us all to more eloquently and effectively ex-
press ourselves.160 The Copyright Act creates space for these 
nonmarket values by permitting de minimis uses (such as tri-
vial mentions in everyday conversation) and even creative vari-
ations (such as transformative re-imaginations of art or litera-
ture) of protected works.161 Similarly, the value of invention lies 
not only in the sales or licensing of patented devices, but also in 
the contributions that innovations make to the store of collec-
tive scientific knowledge.162 For this reason, the Patent Act ex-
tends exclusive rights to inventors only on the condition that 
they disclose their process publicly so that others may learn 
from it.163 
Significantly, positive law does not find the public-
regarding elements of patent and copyright at all inconsistent 
with their treatment as forms of property. The Copyright Act 
and the Patent Act create regulatory schemes that reflect the 
basic ownership structure that arose out of the common law of 
real and personal property.164 These statutes enshrine users’ 
 
 158. See Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Com-
munity, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 142–43 (2009) (stating that society 
has an interest in recognizing the obligations of owners and the state to re-
spect and facilitate the flourishing of others). 
 159. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine 
Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 572 (2004) 
(“[C]opyright law recognizes that selection and arrangement can be highly 
creative, valuable activities even if the editor does not add content of her 
own.”). 
 160. See, e.g., id. at 573 (observing that in his Texas v. Johnson dissent, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed the strength of his feeling for the American 
flag by quoting John Greenleaf Whittier’s poem Barbara Frietchie (citing Tex-
as v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 424–25 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting))). 
 161. E.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding no lia-
bility for appropriation artist Jeff Koons for his use of copyright-protected pho-
tographs of fashion models in collages). 
 162. See Cohen, supra note 151, at 1809. 
 163. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION CON-
CERNING PATENTS (2005), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/ 
#novelty. 
 164. This is in reference to Thomas Grey’s familiar, though somewhat in-
formal, definition of property as entailing the rights to use, exclude, transfer, 
and possibly to destroy. Grey, supra note 95, at 69. On whether the last of 
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rights to use and transfer their goods, and to exclude others 
from using those goods.165 IP can be bequeathed on death and 
attached following an adverse court settlement.166 The ele-
ments of patent and copyright that make them seem unlike 
land or chattels—most familiarly the limited terms of owners’ 
rights—do not lead courts to conclude that they are not proper-
ty, but rather that they are forms of property that happen to be 
subject to limitations in the public interest.167 These authorities 
all suggest that, contrary to what the ownership model presup-
poses, a property system animated largely by the idea of the 
public good lies in perfect harmony with the notion of private 
ownership in ideas.168 As the Supreme Court observed, while 
the law extends the exclusive rights of creators and inventors, 
it “never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all 
possible uses of his work.”169 
The characteristics of intellectual property that I just dis-
cussed are familiar, but I list them here to stress that the pa-
tent and copyright system is best described as a property sys-
tem, albeit one featuring both private and public elements 
existing in a complex symbiosis. Yet each of the rhetorical ap-
proaches that we have seen—property romance, with its full-
blooded embrace of the language of possession, and property 
anxiety, with its ambivalent resistance to the same—fail to rec-
ognize the nuanced reality of what it means to call copyrights 
and patents forms of property. Instead, each of these rhetorical 
tactics falls victim to the same flawed assumption that “proper-
ty” means only what the ownership discourse says it means: 
private ownership concentrated in firms or individuals, result-
ing in complete control of the owned object.170 Thus both prop-
erty romance and property anxiety profoundly misconstrue the 
nature of property, which includes multiple forms of possession, 
 
these really is a meaningful constituent component of the property right, see 
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 783–87 
(2005). 
 165. See Grey, supra note 95, at 69. 
 166. Cf. id. (describing some elemental features of property). 
 167. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 168. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 129, at 712 (“When things are left open to 
the public, they are thought to be wasted by overuse or underuse.”). This does 
not mean, of course, that the balance of public and private interests in infor-
mation goods lies at an optimal level; that is a debate I am not seeking to en-
gage here. 
 169. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
432 (1984). 
 170. See Grey, supra note 95, at 69. 
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as well as a variety of limits and obligations on owners.171 This 
is why the social discourse of property provides a more coherent 
account of how IP is property: it doesn’t shrink from regarding 
shared information resources as owned resources, but instead 
stresses that they are shared—not purely private—forms of 
property in which the public has entitlements.  
B. ADDRESSING THE KELO-ELDRED PUZZLE 
With these points in mind, I turn back to the puzzle with 
which I began this Article. Why did the confiscation of physical 
property in Kelo provoke such rage, while the broad reduction 
of intellectual property rights in Eldred provoked no such reac-
tion? As we have seen, the reason is that Kelo was portrayed 
primarily as an incursion on property (which it was) while pub-
lic dialogue about Eldred, by contrast, did not invoke the lan-
guage of possession or ownership. The difference was not mere-
ly semantic. Reading Kelo as a case about a wronged property 
owner gave it a social resonance that led to a massive (and still 
ongoing) backlash. Eldred was not cast in this same light, so 
the taking of the public entitlement approved in that case could 
not access the deeply felt emotions necessary to generate a Ke-
lo-style backlash. The Kelo-Eldred puzzle is not merely an in-
tellectual conundrum, but a social problem. The absence of pub-
lic outcry in response to uncompensated takings of public 
information permits this practice to proliferate, as evidenced by 
the spate of owner-friendly legislation in the past decade.172 
The result is a classic public choice problem.173 The public’s dif-
fuse interests in preserving shared information entitlements 
will continue to be underrepresented in legislative processes 
compared to the narrowly focused interests of content indus-
tries, causing the latter to prevail despite representing the less 
socially optimal outcome. 
Understanding IP through the social discourse of property 
sheds new light on this dilemma. Consider a thought experi-
 
 171. See Litman, supra note 153, at 337. 
 172. See, e.g., Artists’ Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-9, 119 Stat. 218 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 and 18 
U.S.C.); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Copyright 
Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 173. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
141–48 (1965) (discussing the tendency of special interests to dominate legis-
lative processes). 
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ment. What if, rather than resisting property-talk, writers con-
cerned about public entitlements in information explicitly cast 
their concerns about the public domain in terms of attempts to 
protect an affirmative ownership entitlement—in terms, that 
is, of defending threats to public property? Content industries 
currently deploy, with great effect, property romance as a rhe-
torical strategy designed to protect and extend their entitle-
ments in information resources.174 The romantic message is 
simple and resonant. IP is property, and if you steal it, you’re 
committing a legal and moral wrong.175 Property romance 
proved, in this respect, spectacularly persuasive. As Peggy Ra-
din observed, “analogies to physical property, and invasion of 
physical property . . . are showstoppers of persuasion.”176  
My suggestion is that defenders of the public domain 
should also leverage the persuasive power of property rhetor-
ic.177 The users’ rights approach should combat content indus-
tries’ property-talk with more, rather than less, property-talk 
by invoking the notion of property in a way that uses the social 
discourse to emphasize the public/private nature of ownership. 
Low-protectionists should concede that information, like physi-
 
 174. See, e.g., Doug Bedell, The MP3 Wave: As Millions Download Music 
Off the Net, Piracy Enforcement Flounders, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 27, 
1999, at 1F (quoting former Recording Industry Association of America Presi-
dent Hillary Rosen describing her aim as protecting artists whose property is 
being “taken from them and distributed without their permission”). 
 175. See id.; I would be remiss in ending this footnote without mentioning 
what is probably the most familiar incarnation of this rhetorical strategy:  
YOU WOULDN’T STEAL A CAR  
YOU WOULDN’T STEAL A HANDBAG  
YOU WOULDN’T STEAL A TELEVISION  
YOU WOULDN’T STEAL A DVD  
DOWNLOADING PIRATED FILMS IS STEALING  
STEALING IS AGAINST THE LAW 
PIRACY. IT’S A CRIME. 
YouTube: Downloading Movies from the Internet Is Illegal, http://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=-7QAS5ze86c (last visited Dec. 11, 2009). This MPAA-produced 
feature plays prior to most major-release motion pictures and at the beginning 
of most (legitimate) DVDs. The above script is read as a voiceover while im-
ages of sleazy-looking robbers breaking into cars are jump-cut alongside im-
ages of relatively innocent-looking people using computers. It is both the 
apotheosis of property romance, and a great indication of how powerful and 
pervasive a rhetorical device it can be. 
 176. Margaret Jane Radin, Information Tangibility, in ECONOMICS, LAW 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 395, 400 (Ove Granstrand ed., 2003). 
 177. Cf. Gurman, supra note 37 (arguing that emphasizing public values in 
debates about copyright and digital media has the potential to push copyright 
law in a more progressive direction). 
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cal resources, can be thought of as property, but emphasize 
that this does not mean that all information must be subject to 
private control. This rhetoric would stress that while culture 
and information can be thought of as the subjects of a property 
relationship, that conception includes not only private, but also 
public property—something we are all entitled to enjoy. Such 
an approach would access the powerful moral heuristics asso-
ciated with physical property, but would do so in a way that ex-
tends to all forms of ownership, rather than just private pos-
session.178  
Thus, when content industries claim that “information is 
ours, and stealing it is wrong,” the best rhetorical countermove 
is one that invokes, rather than shrinks, from property. Instead 
of responding with something along the lines of “information 
wants to be free,” it would be more effective to say “certainly 
some information is yours, but some is not, and the latter be-
longs to all of us as shared property that you are free to use.” 
This approach would manifest itself in legislative debates over 
the scope of IP rights,179 litigation that touches on the same is-
sue,180 and public service messages designed to raise conscious-
ness of the existence of the public domain and the importance 
of preserving it.181  
 
 178. See Sunstein, supra note 36, at 531–35 (discussing how framing issues 
affects the use of particular moral heuristics). 
 179. When owners and their representatives angrily claim that their prop-
erty is being threatened as a basis for demanding broader copyright and pa-
tent protection, users’ rights advocates should counter that such expansions in 
IP rights should be made subject to the limitation that they do not excessively 
attenuate the public’s property interests in common information entitlements. 
 180. When judicial opinions say “thou shalt not steal,” Grand Upright Mu-
sic Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(quoting Exodus 20:15), the answer will become “from whom?” A decision that 
too narrowly interprets the fair-use defense effectively takes entitlements 
from the public, just as a decision that permits illegal filesharing would coun-
tenance taking from a private owner. 
The litigants in Eldred employed a variation on this theme at the trial 
level, arguing that the CTEA violated the public trust doctrine. Eldred v. Re-
no, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999). The district court rejected this argu-
ment, narrowly construing the public trust doctrine to apply only to navigable 
waters. Id. at 4 (“Insofar as the public trust doctrine applies to navigable wa-
ters and not copyrights, the retroactive extension of copyright protection does 
not violate the public trust doctrine.”). 
 181. This ad might be phrased as: “You wouldn’t let your government sell 
the Grand Canyon for use as a private garbage dump, would you? You 
wouldn’t let your government give Yellowstone to a developer to create a 
shopping mall, would you? But this is just what the government is doing when 
it gives our treasured cultural resources to private companies by extending 
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This approach promises two salubrious effects. The first is 
restoration of rhetorical balance in debates over the scope of 
patent and copyright. Content industries’ claims of wrongful 
taking resonate because they possess a core of truth. Unambi-
guous cases of infringement—such as unauthorized copying 
and reselling of protected works like DVDs—reduce artists’ in-
comes and attenuate their incentives to create, while producing 
almost no social utility gain.182 But the aggression with which 
content industries press their message threatens to over-deter. 
If people become convinced that all, or even most, information 
is private, they will lose sight of the fact that large swaths of 
our culture are publicly available resources, dedicated to com-
mon use specifically because they generate more utility when 
available to all.183 The unbalanced character of the content in-
dustries’ information campaign is particularly evident in their 
recent attempts to inculcate a strong pro-owner perspective in 
young Americans.184 Owners’ and content industries’ ability to 
capture the rhetorical high ground in this debate depends, in 
large part, on their being the only side in the debate that in-
vokes property rhetoric. This creates a dialogue that pits prop-
erty against not-property and results in “ownership creep”—
with nothing in popular culture to counteract content indus-
tries’ claims, their ownership talk will tend to convince people 
that all information is proprietary (or, at least, that far more 
information is privately owned than actually is).185 Here is 
where a users’ rights approach that uses property-talk can 
help, by providing an effective rhetorical counterpunch to own-
ers’ overbroad intimations that all takings of information are 
 
copyright terms. Culture is a form of property that belongs to all of us, and to 
future generations, in common. Don’t let the government give our property 
away for free to wealthy businesses.”  
 182. See Bedell, supra note 174. 
 183. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 127–28 (arguing that the CTEA’s copy-
right term extension benefits a few individuals at the expense of the larger 
public). 
 184. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Boy Scouts Get MPAA-Approved Merit 
Badge, ARS TECHNICA, Oct. 20, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/news/ 
2006/10/8044.ars (describing approval by the Los Angeles Boy Scouts of a me-
rit badge designed to promote respect for copyrights on terms influenced by 
the MPAA); Posting of David Kravets to WIRED, http://www.wired.com/threat 
level/2008/08/nonprofit-distr/ (Aug. 21, 2008, 15:06 EST) (showing youth-
oriented anti-infringement materials, which wrongly state that illegal peer-to-
peer filesharing is a state criminal offense). 
 185. Cf. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual 
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 901–03 (2007) (illustrating examples of stra-
tegic behavior on the part of copyright owners). 
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wrongful. By using the language of possession in a full-blooded 
manner and stressing that the public’s claim to shared cultural 
resources is an enforceable property interest that merits much 
the same kind of respect that private entitlements do, low-
protectionists can capture some of the rhetorical thunder of 
property romance that is now monopolized by high-
protectionists and restore balance to what is now a skewed di-
alogue.186  
Second, explicitly invoking the language of property in di-
alogues about copyright and patent promises to create social 
consciousness about the public domain. Owners use the lan-
guage of property with facility because they conceive of devices 
and works of authorship as particular objects and things that 
belong to them.187 The existence of well-defined entitlements in 
things is a prerequisite to consciousness of a property relation-
ship with those things.188 The reason that attenuations of pub-
lic entitlements in information fail to generate widespread re-
sistance is, to a large extent, because (users like Eric Eldred 
and law professors like Lawrence Lessig aside) the public is not 
acutely conscious that such entitlements exist.189 Nor are cur-
rent rhetorical approaches likely to change this. Casting de-
bates about entitlements in intellectual property as between 
property and not-property190 does not give a sense that the lat-
ter position stands for anything, and correspondingly fails to 
access the kinds of visceral reactions occasioned by the lan-
guage of possession and ownership invoked by the other side.191 
 
 186. Cf. Marty Jezer, Capture the Flag, COMMONDREAMS.ORG, Aug. 6, 
2004, http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0806-03.htm (discussing how 
Democrats’ overt assertions of patriotism and use of American-flag imagery in 
the 2004 Democratic National Convention were an attempt to attenuate the 
previously dominant view that Republicans held a monopoly on patriotism). 
 187. See David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 
139, 147 (2009) (“The term ‘property’ is commonly conflated with private prop-
erty in both academic literature and the popular mind . . . .”). 
 188. See id. (stating that clearly demarcated entitlements in public or pri-
vate resources are a prerequisite for their efficient exploitation); cf. Henry E. 
Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 455–56 (2002) (discussing the role of clear 
boundaries in strategies for governing real property). 
 189. Cf. Anderson, supra note 184 (mentioning that an MPAA-approved 
merit badge program fails to inform Los Angeles Boy Scouts about “public do-
main material”). 
 190. E.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 69 (2008) (comparing copy-
right to Swiss cheese—i.e., as owners’ rights shot through with empty spaces 
to symbolize users’ privileges and the public domain). 
 191. See Sunstein, supra note 36, at 531–35. 
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Property rhetoric promises to foster this lacking consciousness 
by emphasizing the extent to which the public domain is some-
thing we all possess via shared access and use entitlements. 
Articulating the public’s interests in terms of possession will 
also cause the public to understand that shared culture is 
theirs—a resource they own in common, rather than something 
unrelated or unconnected to them—and will encourage a sense 
of both entitlement to these resources and corresponding anger 
when these resources are taken without compensation.192 The 
development of a new consciousness about public resources is 
not unprecedented. As recently as the 1950s, the now-familiar 
idea of the environment was not well-known.193 But with grow-
ing concern about eco-catastrophes in the 1960s and 1970s, 
widespread concern about natural resources emerged and coa-
lesced into what we now know as the environmental move-
ment.194 Using property rhetoric for the public domain could 
aid the project of creating a similar kind of social movement for 
the preservation of commonly owned information by encourag-
ing consciousness and stewardship of our shared cultural re-
sources.195 
 
 192. See Jonathan R. Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 
WASH. U. L.R. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 7), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1463782 (“[F]raming similar in-
formation in different ways systematically attenuates . . . or conversely streng-
thens . . . property perceptions, attitudes, and reactions.”). 
 193. Cf. Elizabeth Kolbert, Human Nature, NEW YORKER, May 28, 2007, at 
23, 23 (discussing the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s lack of knowledge re-
garding the environmental ramifications of using certain pesticides to kill fire 
ants during the 1950s). 
 194. See id. (characterizing the emergence of an environmental conscious-
ness in the 1960s brought on, to a large extent, by Rachel Carson’s writing and 
activism). 
 195. A variation of this movement is already afoot to the extent that many 
defenders of the public domain describe their work as part of a “cultural envi-
ronmentalist” movement. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 190, at 230–47 (calling 
for an “[e]nvironmentalism for [i]nformation”); James Boyle, A Politics of Intel-
lectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 110–12 
(1997) (drawing lessons for intellectual property politics from the environmen-
tal movement). The explicit linking of environmentalism and a progressive 
politics of IP is undoubtedly helpful insofar as it seeks to create consciousness 
of public entitlements in information.  
Similarly, numerous scholars have deployed commons theory as a way to 
identify the social benefits of shared information resources. E.g., BENKLER, 
supra note 86, at 23; Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the 
Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265793; Rose, supra note 129, at 723. This ap-
proach, too, bears great promise as a way to push academic dialogue about IP 
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The commonplace tendency—especially in the popular con-
sciousness—to conflate “property” with privately owned physi-
cal resources may raise skepticism about using property as a 
rhetorical strategy to preserve the public domain. This objec-
tion has two valences. The first is that rhetorically recasting IP 
as property simply cannot access the same visceral reaction 
that people have to incursions on possession of land and chat-
tels because we possess a uniquely strong connection to physi-
cal things in the world rather than to abstractions like informa-
tion.196 It is certainly right that land—and the family home in 
particular—occupy a privileged place in the pantheon of objects 
of the property relation, but this does not mean that other 
kinds of property cannot generate powerful emotional reac-
tions. Consider the content industries’ reaction to peer-to-peer 
filesharing and other forms of digital infringement. Owners and 
their representatives are invariably outraged at these in-
fringements, and express that outrage in terms of wrongful de-
privations of property.197 If anything, there is reason to think 
that attenuations of rights in intangible property are more 
keenly felt by owners than attenuations of rights in physical 
property. The subject matters of copyright and patent are 
products of someone’s creative and inventive faculties, and so 
 
to recognize the distinctive features of IP that cause it to generate high value 
when governed as a commons. 
In light of this, it should be clear that my thesis is not that there have 
been no attempts to link the idea of physical property with IP in a way that 
pushes in favor of enhancing the public domain. Neither of these approaches, 
though, encourages the inclusion of IP within a rhetorical (as opposed to ana-
lytical) property tradition. I thus seek to supplement these two extant views 
by encouraging the deployment of property language in public debates about 
the ideal scope of IP. My approach thus differs in two respects from the cul-
tural environmentalism and commons literature. First, I encourage public di-
alogue about IP to explicitly cast public information resources as property, ra-
ther than as nonproperty, see, e.g., James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of 
Property, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2003) (describing the public do-
main as “the ‘outside’ of the intellectual property system”), for all the pragmat-
ic reasons enumerated in this Part. Second, I encourage this usage beyond the 
context of academic debates about IP, but also in public dialogue—whether 
legislative, judicial, or popular—in order to create a general consciousness of 
the property status of shared intangible goods. 
 196. Courts tend to prioritize land over other forms of property—at least in 
takings law—but commentators have questioned the viability of this distinc-
tion. See Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Prefe-
rence for Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 
230–33 (2004). 
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 58–67 (cataloguing IP owners’ use 
of property language to articulate their concerns about attenuations of copy-
right and patent rights). 
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may well be tied in some essential sense to the self.198 Creative 
work in particular has an expressive quality that makes it 
more than just a commodity in trade, as evidenced by the hoary 
but telling cliché invoked by countless musicians, “my songs are 
like my kids.”199 Certainly some physical property—the family 
home, a beloved heirloom—has a similar sense of connection 
with the self that transcends objective valuation, but the preva-
lence of commercial property and functional apartments belies 
any claim that we necessarily have a stronger emotional con-
nection to real property and personalty than to intangible 
goods. 
One might also argue that property rhetoric cannot be ef-
fectively leveraged in favor of preserving public information 
goods because even if owners of private intellectual property 
react with outrage at incursions on their possession, the same 
reaction cannot accompany incursions on public information 
resources. Again, experience shows otherwise. Consider the 
public backlash that ensued in 1996 when the American Socie-
ty of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) sent cease-
and-desist notices to the Girl Scouts concerning their singing 
campfire songs like “Puff the Magic Dragon” and “God Bless 
America.”200 The Scouts had believed (wrongly, as it turned 
out)201 that these songs were part of the public domain, and the 
incident led to a public outcry at ASCAP’s attempt to put a 
price on the Scouts’ exercise of this nonexclusive, shared en-
 
 198. See Radin, supra note 97, at 958–61, 978–79 (discussing the extent to 
which the self can become entangled with the object of ownership, and pro-
pounding a theory of ownership that correlates property protection with the 
extent to which an object is bound up with its owner’s identity). The owner of 
the patent or copyright, as opposed to its creator, may have no such personal 
connection to the device or work, of course. 
 199. E.g., Rod McKuen, Flight Plan, http://www.mckuen.com/flights/101000 
.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2000) (“My songs are like my kids and I want them 
treated right.”). 
 200. Lisa Bannon, Birds May Sing, But Campers Can’t Unless They Pay 
Up, S. COAST TODAY, Aug. 23, 1996, http://archive.southcoasttoday.com/daily/ 
08-96/08-23-96/b02li056.htm. 
 201. Most of the songs at issue actually were copyright protected, which 
meant that ASCAP’s claim was perfectly valid. Id. As a representative from 
ASCAP said, the Girl Scouts “buy paper, twine and glue for their crafts—they 
can pay for their music, too.” Id. The fact that the use was widely perceived to 
be in the public domain, though, suffices to illustrate the point that the public 
is capable of visceral outrage when they feel as though their public—as well as 
private—entitlements in information come under attack.  
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titlement.202 Certainly part of the backlash derived from AS-
CAP’s choice of target; corporate licensing organizations bully-
ing Girl Scouts can hardly be expected to garner much sympa-
thy. But the public’s reaction derived also from a sense that 
ASCAP was encroaching on a preexisting public entitlement.203 
The idea of singing well-known songs around a campfire—or in 
the shower, or in your car—is the kind of participation in cul-
ture that we expect to be able to engage in free of charge. And 
whether we are right or wrong about that as a matter of law, 
the fact of the backlash alone shows that the public is capable 
of reacting with outrage to takings of public as well as private 
entitlements.204  
This point rests on the rather unsurprising premise that 
people are more than myopic utility-maximizers. The assump-
tion that only takings of private property are capable of gene-
rating powerful reactions relies on the facile assumption that 
we can see no further than the short-term maximization of our 
own wealth.205 In fact, there are numerous instances of people 
acting to counter threats to someone else’s private property in 
the interest of sustaining a beneficial system of property. In 
 
 202. The threats to sue the Scouts led to a huge public outcry that turned 
into a PR disaster for ASCAP. Thaai Walker & Kevin Fagan, Girl Scouts 
Change Their Tunes, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 23, 1996, at A1 (quoting ASCAP’s li-
censing vice president as saying “we got a big black eye from this”). The licens-
ing organization soon backed down, hedging on their original story and claim-
ing that they hadn’t meant to target campfire sing-alongs, but only public, for-
profit performances by the Girl Scouts. Id. Now a chastened ASCAP charges 
the Girl Scouts $1 per year for the right to sing licensed songs. Jonathan Zit-
train, Calling Off the Copyright War, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 24, 2002, at D12. 
 203. Similar indignation has accompanied attempts to perform the song 
“Happy Birthday to You,” which most people consider a standard public en-
titlement, but for which ASCAP seeks to charge a license fee whenever con-
tacted about it. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Same Old Song, WIRED, July 
2005, at 100. Some writers have suggested that “Happy Birthday to You” is in 
fact no longer copyrighted, Robert Brauneis, Copyright and the World’s Most 
Popular Song, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 335, 338 (2009), but regardless of 
the song’s legal status, the point remains that asking people to treat “Happy 
Birthday to You” as privately proprietary rather than a free element of shared 
culture causes a visceral sense of injustice. 
 204. The popular resistance to the enclosure movement in early modern 
England provides a historical example of widespread objection to reallocation 
of common land to private owners. See THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 32–33 (Mildred 
Campbell ed., Walter J. Black, Inc. 1947) (1516) (satirizing the enclosure 
movement and characterizing public-to-private redistribution of commons as a 
form of theft).  
 205. See generally Rose, supra note 128, at 43–45 (cataloguing different 
kinds of preference models that include but are not limited to the standard ra-
tional utility maximizer). 
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northern cities, the social norm is to let the individual who digs 
the snow out of a street parking space use that space exclusive-
ly until it is snowed back in.206 Where drivers inconsiderately 
park in spaces they have not dug out themselves, members of 
the local community often come to the aid of the space’s rightful 
possessor by warning the offender or even vandalizing the of-
fending vehicle.207 Similarly, local residents in Boulder, Colora-
do protested vociferously when a citizen acquired part of a 
neighbor’s land by adverse possession, even though the adverse 
possession claim posed no threat to anyone else’s title.208  
The instinctive concern for maintenance of shared public 
resources can also be articulated in terms of existence value. 
Actors derive value not only from exploiting resources, but in 
some cases, from merely knowing that they exist. For example, 
I would object strongly if the federal government sought to sell 
the Grand Canyon to a private company for use as a garbage 
dump, even though I may never visit the Grand Canyon again. 
This phenomenon emerged on a wider scale in 2008 when Gov-
ernor Schwarzenegger threatened to shut down over fifty Cali-
fornia state parks due to an impending budget crisis.209 In re-
sponse, donations poured in from sources in and out of state,210 
many of which came from people who will never use the vast 
majority of the threatened parks, but still gain existence value 
from knowing they are there. Monuments provide a final ex-
ample of the hold that public property has over the popular im-
agination, as the debate over San Francisco’s Pioneer Monu-
ment illustrates. Native American groups wanted the 
monument removed due to its purportedly offensive account of 
pioneer history, but this effort met with objections by those who 
 
 206. See Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on 
Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 515, 528–29 (2002). 
 207. Id. at 531–32. 
 208. See John Aguilar, Hard Feelings on Hardscrabble Drive, BOULDER 
DAILY CAMERA, Nov. 19, 2007, at A1; Couple Could Lose Third of Land in 
Boulder, VAIL DAILY, Nov. 25, 2007, http://www.vaildaily.com/article/2007 
1125/NEWS/71125004. Biologists have also observed this kind of other-
regarding preference in some species of birds that attack invaders of other 
birds’ established habitats. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property Instinct, 359 
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 1763, 1767 (2004). 
 209. See National Trust for Historic Preservation, America’s 11 Most Endan-
gered Places, http://www.preservationnation.org/travel-and-sites/sites/western 
-region/californias-state-parks.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2009) (describing 
budget-related threats to California state parks). 
 210. See Save Our State Parks Supporters, http://www.savestateparks.org/ 
supporters/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2009). 
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derived value from the symbolic value of the monument’s pres-
ence.211  
We invoke the language of property narrowly to refer to 
rights in private things, usually land. The foregoing discussion 
seeks to show that a broader conception of what property 
means as a matter of law and legal theory gestures at a broader 
variety of ways to deploy property rhetoric. That intellectual 
property in particular is most coherently understood as a sys-
tem of social relations rather than exclusive private dominion 
suggests that the language of property can be used in defense 
of, rather than in opposition to, public entitlements in informa-
tion. That writers across the spectrum have not yet made this 
move does not mean that it is implausible, but only that popu-
lar discussions about the scope of patent and copyright have 
lacked imagination. But even if it were true that tangible—
especially real—property has more of a hold on the popular 
mind than its intangible counterpart, it would not be the end of 
the story. The foregoing discussion can be taken as expressing 
a normative aspiration as well as a descriptive reality. As we’ve 
seen, rhetoric not only reflects, but also constructs, the world of 
law. So the project of recasting IP through the lens of property, 
as something we all possess rather than something nobody 
does, has the promise to foundationally change how we regard 
cultural resources.212 By leveraging the romantic power of the 
idea of possession in the service of the public domain, the public 
may grow to regard its interests in intangible goods with some-
thing like the covetous reverence that it does physical property. 
 
 211. See SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE 27–28 (1998). The con-
troversy over Decalogues, such as the one in Montgomery, Alabama that Jus-
tice Roy Moore refused to remove, provides another illustration of the power of 
public property in the popular imagination. Moore’s intransigence in the face 
of a court order stirred both anger and support from countless people who will 
never set foot in Montgomery. Cf. Rob Boston, Commandment from the Court: 
Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore’s Decalogue Display Violates Constitution, 
Says Federal Appellate Panel, as Dispute Moves Toward Showdown, 56 
CHURCH & ST. 172, 172–74 (2003), available at http://www.au.org/media/ 
church-and-state/archives/2003/09/commandment-from.html. 
 212. Cf. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social 
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 948 (2006) (“Social movements . . . con-
struct the semantic normative climate in which people talk about the great 
constitutional issues of the day . . . [and] can play an important role in reo-
rienting law to shifting social understandings so that legal and social institu-
tions remain in dynamic relation to one another.”). 
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  CONCLUSION: 
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE PROPERTY, AGAIN   
Hanoch Dagan once observed that “[f]riends of the public 
domain are typically suspicious of property-talk.”213 Dagan’s pi-
thy characterization of the relationship of property rhetoric to 
the public domain is descriptively accurate, but it shouldn’t be. 
Three steps show why. First, exploring invocations of the rhe-
toric of ownership in debates over the ideal scope of patent and 
copyright shows why low protectionists have been allergic to 
property talk. Property romantics have, with great effect, 
couched their appeals for broader owners’ rights in terms of the 
simple, appealing language of ownership.214 This move has 
caused property anxiety to emerge in friends of the public do-
main, who have not unreasonably assumed that more property 
rhetoric represents a threat to their interests. This initial de-
scriptive step frames the second one: that this presumed oppo-
sition between property and the public domain is false. It false-
ly assumes that property can be understood only in terms of the 
ownership discourse, which emphasizes nearly complete control 
of owned resources and maximization of private wealth. This 
opposition is false because it ignores the presence of another, 
social discourse of property that stresses the presence of public 
and common resources as well as the capacity of property to 
generate nonmarket goods. In fact, the social discourse of prop-
erty provides a far better language in which to talk about IP 
than the ownership discourse does. This second descriptive step 
sets up a final, normative move: I argue that friends of the pub-
lic domain would do well to embrace, rather than resist, proper-
ty rhetoric. Property romantics’ full-blooded embrace of the 
language of ownership in public debates about the ideal scope 
of IP has skewed these debates in their favor, and those con-
cerned about the public domain lack an effective counterpunch. 
By framing their concern about the public domain as a concern 
about preserving public property (rather than simply resisting 
property), actors concerned about this issue can restore balance 
to this debate. This use of property rhetoric for the public do-
main can also foster a general sense that limiting the public 
domain is an affront to shared ownership entitlements, thereby 
 
 213. Hanoch Dagan, Symposium, Property and the Public Domain, 18 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 84, 84 (2006). 
 214. See Epstein, supra note 56, at 75 (arguing that websites “are a new 
form of chattel, which are presumptively governed by the law of trespass to 
chattels”); Warner, supra note 56, at 120 (same). 
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encouraging respect for, and stewardship of, common cultural 
resources. 
Beyond this central thesis, I also seek to introduce into the 
IP literature a series of insights that have long animated writ-
ing about physical property. Most property literature roughly 
follows one of two major schools of thought.215 One major strain 
of property scholarship lies within the Demsetzian tradition, 
which presumes that property systems trend toward greater 
private control of resources.216 This property tradition, inspired 
by Coase217 as well as Demsetz, has had its modern apotheosis 
in the neoclassical law-and-economics literature. This approach 
stresses expansive private ownership rights as the best means 
of maximizing social welfare.218 Such instrumentalist claims 
about the value of private possession necessarily presuppose 
strong property rights—and in particular, exclusion rights219—
that inhere in private individuals or firms. Related libertarian 
defenses of the ownership discourse of property emphasize the 
extent to which state-backed private property rights provide 
individuals with a bulwark against government incursions on 
liberty.220  
The ownership discourse has no shortage of adherents, but 
at least as numerous are writers who take a different view. Ni-
neteenth-century radicals argued that property was inherently 
immoral and should be abolished.221 Margaret Radin has sug-
 
 215. These few paragraphs are meant to be a satellite-level overview rather 
than anything like the exhaustive literature review that would really do jus-
tice to these schools of thought.  
 216. E.g., Demsetz, supra note 120, at 350 (explaining that “the emergence 
of new private or state-owned property rights” in communities with different 
ownership systems “will be in response to changes in technology and relative 
prices”). 
 217. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1 (1960) (establishing the foundations of the Coase Theorem). 
 218. See EPSTEIN, supra note 15; see also Richard A. Epstein, Notice and 
Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1359–
60 (1982) (arguing that the touch and concern requirements for covenants and 
servitudes unnecessarily constrain property and do not uphold “efficient land 
use”). 
 219. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109; Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 
15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 220. E.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7–21 (1962); F. A. 
HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 139–41 (1960). 
 221. E.g., PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 38 (Benjamin 
R. Tucker trans., William Reeves 1902) (1840) (introducing the famous aphor-
ism la propriété, c’est le vol translated as “property is robbery!”). This extreme 
critique lacks many contemporary adherents, though some Native American 
writers have espoused something close to this view. See, e.g., PETER MAT-
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gested that property’s focus on market production creates a 
general tone of commodification, threatening to reduce the 
world to no more than a series of objects in trade, and eliminat-
ing other criteria of value so that human experience itself is 
diminished.222 Critics in a more doctrinal vein have argued that 
the ownership discourse’s emphasis on an absolute notion of 
possession cannot be squared with positive law.223 Carol Rose’s 
writing shows that a focus on private possession fails to ac-
count for the multiplicity of public and common forms of prop-
erty, and that public property must exist alongside and in com-
bination with private ownership in order to generate maximum 
social efficiency.224 Still others have stressed the extent to 
which ownership can enhance social and communal bonds,225 
and have highlighted the capacity of property to further social 
justice.226 
These various perspectives on property reveal a richness 
within the literature about what (physical) property means. 
While one may be an advocate of strong private property rights 
for owners of tangible things, one could not do so without con-
sciousness that this is only one of myriad ways to think about 
possession of physical property.227 The intellectual property li-
 
THIESSEN, INDIAN COUNTRY 119 (1984) (quoting a Cherokee man, Jimmie 
Durham, expressing the view that land cannot and should not be privately 
possessed). 
 222. Radin, supra note 84, at 1851, 1903 (resisting the universal commodi-
fication of objects “as the sole discourse of human life” and suggesting instead 
the inalienability of some things, “grounded in noncommodification of things 
important to personhood”); see also Radin, supra note 97, at 957–61. 
 223. Of course, even a brief consideration of the limits implicit and explicit 
in real and personal property law reveal the shortfalls of the descriptive aspect 
of property absolutism. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in 
Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1556 (1989) (describing the idea 
of absolute property ownership as a “myth” that fails to account for the fact 
that “our entitlement becomes less and less absolute” and stressing that “own-
ership of property has always been a privilege granted by society, and revoca-
ble” (quoting WILLIAM KITTREDGE, OWNING IT ALL 64 (1987))); Williams, su-
pra note 101, at 280–83 (“Many commentators have noted the gap between the 
political rhetoric of absolute property rights and the practice of limited proper-
ty rights.”). 
 224. Rose, supra note 129, at 713, 723. 
 225. Peñalver, supra note 130, at 1894 (highlighting property’s capacity to 
reinforce the bonds of the society in which it exists). 
 226. Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Re-
newed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1242–43 (2005). 
 227. Some writers would contest the view that nonexclusive forms of prop-
erty count as property, but even these writers stake their positions in opposi-
tion to the substantial literature that takes a contrary view of what property 
is. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 138, at 730, 734–39 (arguing that the right to 
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terature, though, fails to reflect this variety of property’s mean-
ings. IP writers typically juxtapose “property” (private rights in 
information) with “not-property” (public rights in informa-
tion).228 And as the prevalence of property anxiety among low 
protectionists suggests, the very introduction of property ideas 
into copyright and patent is taken as a threat to the public do-
main. Copyright and patent scholars alike frequently lament 
the “propertization” of their fields,229 conflating the privatiza-
tion of information resources with the propertization of these 
resources. 
The reigning view among IP writers—at least, those who 
are concerned about maintaining public resources and values in 
copyright and patent—appears to be: property is a problem.230 
This view stems from legitimate concerns about an excess of 
private rights in information, but it expresses an impoverished 
view of what property means. To understand ownership only as 
domination in the service of private wealth maximization is to 
caricature the institution. Rather, as Carol Rose observed, 
“property is one of the most sociable institutions that human 
beings have created, depending as it does on mutual forbear-
ance and on the recognition of and respect for the claims of oth-
ers.”231 And the impoverished view of property that prevails in 
 
exclude is both a “necessary and sufficient condition of identifying . . . proper-
ty” and discussing the major schools of thought on the right to exclude). 
 228. BOYLE, supra note 190, at 38 (describing the public domain as “intel-
lectual property’s outside, its opposite”). 
 229. Carrier, supra note 74, at 4, 6 (equating the “propertization” of intel-
lectual property, which “scholars have lamented,” with “the expansion of the 
duration and scope of initial rights to approach unlimited dimensions”); Lem-
ley, supra note 74, at 895–904 (“Other scholars have lamented the rise of 
property rhetoric and its effects . . . .”). 
 230. Other fields have resisted the introduction of property ideas for simi-
lar reasons. In the field of cultural property, for example, some have resisted 
using property as a strategy to strengthen Native Americans’ control over tri-
bal identity. See generally MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 
7–10 (2003) (“[W]e should be asking not ‘Who owns native culture?’ but ‘How 
can we promote respectful treatment of native cultures and indigenous forms 
of self-expression . . . ?’”). Recent writing has suggested that this resistance is 
premised on an inaccurately narrow view of what property means. See Car-
penter et al., supra note 118, at 1029 (“[C]ultural property critics inappro-
priately ground their critiques in a narrow set of assumptions about proper-
ty . . . .”). 
 231. Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114 YALE L.J. 991, 
1021 (2005); see also Peñalver, supra note 130, at 1894 (“Property as entrance 
does not view property principally as a boundary separating individuals from 
one another but rather as a means of joining individuals to each other in 
community.”). 
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the IP literature raises very real concerns. It causes us to over-
look positive strategies for preserving the public domain that 
depend on explicit recognition of (rather than resistance to) 
shared information resources as a form of property. Elsewhere, 
I have argued that resistance to property can obscure positive 
strategies for preserving the public domain.232 And in this Ar-
ticle, I have sought to show that rhetorical strategies that em-
brace—rather than shrink from—property as a language for 
talking about public entitlements in information promise to 
enrich debates about the appropriate scope of patent and copy-
right law. The claim is, in a sense, simple: we cannot have a 
complete dialogue about what it means for IP to be a form of 
property unless we understand property in all its complexity. 
And property, properly conceived, can highlight rather than ob-
scure the extent to which patent and copyright are systems 
that rely on a symbiosis between public and private entitle-
ments to achieve optimal value for owners and society alike. 
 
 232. See Fagundes, supra note 187, at 143. 
